Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers,
and the Virtues of Casuistry
By PAUL R.

TREMBLAY*

EACH SUNDAY, The New York Times Magazine features a column entitled The Ethicist, written by Randy Cohen.1 In this interesting and witty
column, Cohen answers questions, "Dear Abby"-style, from readers
seeking his advice about whether some action or behavior is ethical or
not. The most intriguing quality of the column is this: week after
week, answer after answer, Cohen is right in each of his responses. He
seldom, if ever, waivers about his advice, or makes excuses about
moral ambiguities or relativist preferences. Instead, he parses each
case before him carefully, assesses the ethical implications, and tells
his readers whether the conduct in question is OK or not. I have yet to
2
see him come out wrong.
Lawyers, of course, encounter ethical questions and morally uncertain choice opportunities on a regular basis. Many observers-and
by many I mean many-believe that the legal profession is riddled with
ethically troublesome practices, 3 implying that lawyers not infrequently choose the wrong answer to their ethical questions, or resolve
* Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I offer deep thanks to those
kind souls who read and commented on an earlier, briefer version of these ideas: Dan
Coquillette, Russell Engler, Dick Huber, Mary Helen McNeal, Alex Scherr, Avi Soifer, and
Mark Spiegel. I also am grateful for the rich assistance provided by Rocky LeAnn Pilgrim
and Amy Leonard, my research assistants. This work was supported by the generosity of
Hale & Dorr, LLP, and Boston College Law School Dean John Garvey.
1. See, e.g., Randy Cohen, A Child's Debt, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 10, 2002, at 22.
2. Apparently, though, others have. See Randy Cohen, On Second Thought, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Mar. 31, 2002, at 20 (responding to letters criticizing his advice). In response to the
criticisms, Cohen changed two of his opinions. His doing so only underscores the point for
which I cite Cohen's work-that ethics can be a reasoned, analytical process in which argument and dialogue might lead to acceptable and coherent answers.
3. For a sampling of the critics, see SOL M. LINOWITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION:
LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 81-96 (2000) [hereinafter D.
RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OFJUSTICE]; Amy C. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the

Lawyers First?Insider and Outsider Views of the Legal Profession, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 835
(1999); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1239 (1991)
[hereinafter Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics]; Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why DiscardingProfessionalIdeology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the
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their moral uncertainties ineptly. The widespread criticism assumes,
quite naturally, that the critics possess a reliable sense of what is good
and what is not, much like Randy Cohen's talent. Notwithstanding this
critical trend, the literature on moral decisionmaking by lawyers reflects a sustained appreciation for, and sometimes deference to, a conception of moral pluralism and "personal values."'4 The assertion that
the legal profession lacks a shared account of normative ethics is as
widespread as the claim that the profession is experiencing a moral
crisis.

5

These companion observations are not easily reconcilable. In this
Article I attempt to puzzle through the seemingly incompatible worries that lawyers are morally at risk and that values are personal and
non-negotiable.6 I do so as, to borrow Alasdair Maclntyre's phrase, a
"plain person' -that is, I am neither a philosopher nor do I possess
the training, the discipline, or the time to understand deeper, metaphysical questions of value as thoroughly as full time philosophers and

Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1257 (1995) [hereinafter Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm
Shift].
4. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary of the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 259, 305 (1995) [hereinafter Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary] (labeling "demonstrably erroneous" the premise that conscientious lawyers agree on the right way to be a good
lawyer and a good person); Bruce Green, The Role of Personal Values in ProfessionalDecisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 33, 34 (1998) (personal values as "idiosyncratic");
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Personal Values and ProfessionalEthics, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 133, 141
(1992) [hereinafter Hazard, Personal Values] (referring to values as "subjective"); Lisa G.
Lerman, Teaching Moral Perception and MoralJudgment In Legal Ethics Courses: A Dialogue
About Goals, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 457, 463 (1998) (noting the opinion of Lizabeth
Moody, Dean of Stetson University College of Law, that "no true consensus exists in the
profession about the values of the profession").
5. The two claims are often made by the same commentator. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 885,
929 (1996) (lawyers "lack a shared, complete account of normative ethics by which to
judge [a criticized law firm's] particular actions"); id. at 932 ("[E]thical error is serious
error: Our aim is its avoidance."); Hazard, Personal Values, supra note 4, at 139 (values are
"subjective"); Hazard, Future of Legal Ethics, supra note 3, at 1239 (profession is in crisis).
6. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods,
66 AM. CATH. PHIL. Q. 3 (1992). MacIntyre himself has borrowed the phrase from the work
of Sir David Ross. SeeW.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GoOD 41 (1930). Other ethics writers

use similar phrases to emphasize the gulf between the sophisticated philosophers and the
persons who must make ethical choices in their daily lives. See, e.g., Carl Elliot, Where Ethics
Comes From and What to Do About It, 22 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28 (1992) (referring to "ordinary
people"). I happened to discover recently that the "plain person" classification has relevance in fields other than the complicated world of moral philosophy. See Fenton v.
Quaboag Country Club, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 216, 219 (1968) (referring to non-golfers as
"plain people," relative to golfers).
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ethicists 7 are likely to do. I am also a clinical law teacher, so in my

puzzling I tend to look for pragmatic, workable ways to talk about
value, worth, norms, and virtues.
I suggest here that there may be ways, at least pragmatic ways, to
talk and teach about values and virtues with lawyers and law students.
My basic thesis is as follows: There is much to be gained by a search
for common, shared norms, and for "paradigm cases" representing
agreed-upon sentiments about how moral issues ought to be resolved,
as a basis for reasoned conversation about more complex moral dilemmas and conflicts. The process I will describe is known as "casuistry." It has roots in early Jesuit thinking9 and has experienced
significant popularity in modern bioethics thinking since the 1990s. 10
Casuistry is a form of ethical reasoning that involves the close analysis
of particular cases, seeking ethical guidance in an inductive manner
rather than deductively through the application of moral theory. Casuists find meaning through paradigm cases and maxims. A case
presenting moral ambiguity may be compared to a series of paradigm
cases and analyzed by reference to accepted maxims, in order to arrive at a reasonably satisfactory solution to the conflict at hand.1 1
The fact that individuals argue about moral questions, using reasoning and logic, combined with the weakness of any claims about
relativism or subjectivism, shows us that the possibilities for identifying
consensus exist. Disagreements will continue to thrive, of course, but
they tend, at bottom, not to be about "values" at all. Most seeming
moral disagreement represents, instead, disputes about facts, predictions, biases, history, perceptions, and the like. Not all disagreement
fits this description, of course, but most will. Recognizing a founda7. Judge Richard Posner derisively refers to scholarly philosophers as "academic
moralists." See Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HA. L. REV.
1637, 1639-40 (1998). Without joining in Posner's rather snide treatment of professional
philosophers, we can agree that his phrase captures a segment of the population very different from most of the rest of us. See also Martha Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise,111 HARV.
L. REV. 1776, 1794-95 (1998) (accepting Posner's critique that most academic moral philosophy writing is inaccessible to plain persons).
8. See ALBERT JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF
MORAL REASONING (1989).
9. See id. at 139-51.
10. See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, MAKING MORTAL CHOICES: THREE EXERCISES IN MORAL CASUISTRY (1997); MARK G. KUCZEWSI, FRAGMENTATION AND CONSENSUS: COMMUNITARIAN AND
CASUIST BIOETHICS (1997); John Arras, Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in
Bioethics, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 29 (1991); Annette Braunack-Mayer, Casuistry as Bioethical
Method: An Empirical Perspective, 53 Soc. Sci. & MED. 71 (2001).
11. See, e.g., Thomas H. Murray, Medical Ethics, Moral Philosophy and Moral Tradition, 25
Soc. SCI. IN MED. 637, 639 (1987).
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tion of shared norms permits in moral disputes the same kind of analytic process law professors use to teach students about substantive law.
If lawyers and law students are open to learning about how best to
make challenging moral choices (a significant qualification, this), a
casuistic process offers some hope for nonrelativistic, reasoned
discourse.
My inquiry proceeds through the following steps. I begin, well, at
the beginning. I start by making explicit the differing reasons why law
schools teach about ethics and values. I suggest three possible reasons:
(1) for the same reasons they teach torts, that is, because the "ethics"
of the legal profession can be useful to practitioners as basic substantive law; (2) for the same reasons bioethicists develop methods of ethical analysis, that is, to aid good faith, conflicted professionals to find
ways to choose amongst similarly attractive (or similarly offensive) ethical alternatives; and (3) for the same reasons therapists and jailers do
their work, that is, to provide incentives for bad or misguided people
to do good things. I point out that the first of these has little, but still
some, relevance to an inquiry about the role of values teaching. The
second and third goals are more directly relevant, but they tend to get
conflated. It helps, I suggest, to distinguish between teaching good
people how to be better and teaching bad people how to be good.
In Parts II and III we consider the challenges of working with the
"good people." Part II reviews some objections to consideration of
moral deliberation as a reasoned, substantive topic, including the
common worry about relativism, questions about the role of faith, and
concerns that values are simply too personal and incommensurable to
permit either teaching about them or reliance upon them in professional ethical contexts. I conclude in Part II that while some important subset of moral conflicts involves inherently incommensurable
value choices, a more significant portion of that world does not. Most
values, we see, are not idiosyncratic or subjective, but instead are connected to deeply shared ideas about what is good.
Part III begins to work with the conception of shared norms. I
start this Part with a critique of the use of moral theory as a basis for
either working from, or obtaining, consensus about value. I then describe a more friendly and practicable approach to moral deliberation-that of casuistry. I follow the introduction to casuistry with an
extended review of, and critique of, recent work by Alan Wolfe, 12 who
12. ALAN WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM: THE IMPOSSIBLE IDEA
Now (2001) [hereinafter A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM];

LIVE

THAT DEFINES THE WAY WE
ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION,

AFTER ALl.: WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS AMERICANS REALLY THINK ABOUT: GOD, COUNTRY, FAMILY,
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has performed elaborate and extensive surveys of and interviews with
typical Americans about their moral beliefs. I use the Wolfe oeuvre to
develop and sustain my argument that most moral disagreement, including the all too familiar culture wars, does not represent a fundamental disconnect about what is worthy and what is not, but
represents instead competing versions of how the world operates. We
may not, of course, be any more confident that we will resolve that
disagreement than we will resolve disagreement about questions of
value, but, it seems fair to say, disputes about fact and about history
have a more firm analytic grounding than true disputes about value
(which I claim are rarer than we might suppose).
Finally, Part IV changes focus, and turns to consideration of the
motivation to care about doing good. In puzzling about what I will call
the "felons, whores, and jerks" in the legal profession, I suggest several
possible perspectives. First, it may be that the critics are wrong injudging the bad lawyers' behaviors as bad. Second, if (as is likely) the critics are not wrong, it might be that the bad lawyers are simply
sociopaths, in which case the academy cannot be too sanguine that it
might make any difference to those lawyers at all. This "sociopath"
thesis is also unlikely, it seems. Third, if the behavior is indeed bad,
perhaps the lawyers intended to do the right thing but just got it
wrong, in which case the "bad" lawyers end up not as corrupt or sociopathic, but instead as deliberatively inept. If this supposition is true,
these lawyers join the "good" lawyers in the audience for teaching
about ethical deliberation. Finally, and perhaps of most interest,
maybe the bad lawyers do such unscrupulous things because of the
demands and pressures, institutional or otherwise, they feel within
their work lives. I explore the possibility that the most promising solution to the bad lawyering phenomenon ought to come from institutional changes, rather than changes in the character or the
decisionmaking prowess of the lawyers.
I.

Why Ethics?

There are important reasons why a professional school might
choose to focus its attention on questions of ethics and value, but
those reasons cover several distinct goals. Any discussion of the role of
values education in a law school ought to distinguish among the sevRACISM, WELFARE, IMMIGRATION, HOMOSEXUALITY, WORK, THE RIGHT, THE LEFT, AND EACH
OTHER

(1998) [hereinafter A.

WOLFE, ONE NATION].
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eral possible purposes for ethics teaching. Here I offer three such
possibilities.
A.

"It's Like Asking Why We Teach Torts": Ethics As Doctrine

Most of ethics instruction in law school is in fact instruction in the
"law of lawyering"-that is, that body of doctrine developed by courts,
bar associations,1 3 and disciplinary authorities which lawyers must understand in order to practice law effectively for their clients. 14 This
complicated legal material plays a critical role in client representation, and law students should know about it before they leave school.
In answer to the question "why teach legal ethics?", the teachers' response might be simple: "It's like asking 'why teach torts?' You just
cannot practice law without knowing this stuff."
Law schools teach torts primarily for externally-focused, instrumental purposes. A graduate of law school will be a bad lawyer, and will
offer poor service, if she doesn't understand torts when she starts to
practice. She will lose her cases, or commit malpractice, or fail to ob13. Bar associations often issue advisory ethics opinions, which form an important
part of the doctrine affecting lawyer behavior. See PeterJoy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers' Conduct (forthcoming 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (arguing that advisory ethics opinions by
bar associations need to be regulated and limited in their influence).
14. Some law school textbooks for legal profession courses shy away from the phrase
"legal ethics" and rely instead on titles reflecting the regulatory law of lawyering themes.
See, e.g., ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & TERESA S. COLLETT, THE RULES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1996);JAMEs E. MOLITERNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

(2000). Other text titles allude to a distinction between the regulatory and the ethical
components of this topic. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND ETHICS (6th ed. 2001); G. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERiNG (3d
ed. 1999); L. RAY PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1989). Indeed, only one legal profession textbook has opted to apply the simple appellation "Legal Ethics," without any reference to law or regulation. See DEBORAH L. RHODE &
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS (3d ed. 2001).
The profound development of the substantive law of lawyering, and its eclipsing the
role of "softer" questions of moral issues, has been noted by many observers. See, e.g.,
Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1273, 1274 (1998) [hereinafter Rostain, Ethics Lost] ("a regulatory approach is inadequate to ensure that lawyer-made law serves broader societal purposes. Regulation is a
poor substitute for legal ethics."); Michael I. Swygert, Striving to Make GreatLawyers-Citizenship and Moral Responsibility: A Jurisprudencefor Law Teaching, 30 B.C. L. REV. 803, 816-17
(1990). It may best be reflected in the inaugural publication of a Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS (2001). The editors have entitled the Restatement as the "Third," despite
its being only the first such publication, apparently to keep it in lock-step with the other
Restatement projects. It is not a little ironic that a treatise intended to reflect the highest
standards of professionalism should resort to a fib for its own organizational uniformity
purposes.
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tain clients, if she doesn't know what the basic legal principles are and
how they work. 1 5 In some (but not all) ways, legal ethics is just like
torts-a graduate should know about, say, the instrumental uses of
Rule 11 motions 16 or motions to disqualify an opposing lawyer for alleged conflicts of interest, 17 if only to defeat those Rambo lawyers who
resort to exploiting these "ethics" rules for tactical gains.' 8 If she
doesn't know these tactical ploys, a lawyer will be at a serious
disadvantage.
In two critical ways, though, legal ethics is different from torts,
and those differences affect conversations and teaching in this area.
First, a significant part of the law of lawyering instruction is instrumental but internally-focused. The purpose of the teaching is not to affect
others' behavior, through strategy or argument, but to enable the student to understand for herself what a proper response is, and to assess
risks to the lawyer's career rather than to her client's case. a9 This aspect of ethics instruction is, perhaps counter intuitively, less interest15.

See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECrION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS

TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING

THE GAP 124-25 (1992) [hereinafter, MACCRATE REPORT]. This topic is of course far more
complicated, but the basic point is sound. This student may never see a torts case, so for
her the arguments just developed are specious. Obviously law schools make judgments
about the odds that a practicing lawyer will encounter a torts case, or a torts doctrine-like
issue, and conclude that a well-rounded lawyer ought to know the basics of this doctrine.
The other apparent flaw in the argument in the text is that many topics are never covered
in law school at all, and other topics (say, Internet law) come into existence after many
students have finished their law school instruction. When pressed, law schools will admit
that they are teaching less "substance" and more "process"-the ability to think like a lawyer and to learn how to understand legal issues as they are encountered. For an administrator's view of these choices, see John Garvey, The Business of Running a Law Schoo4 33 TOL. L.

REv. 37 (2001).
16. See Kevin E. Mohr, Legal Ethics and a Civil Action, 23 SArTTLE U. L. REv. 283,
284-87 (1999); Mark Spiegel, The Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the
Neutrality of ProceduralRules, 32 CONN. L. REV. 155, 156-59 (1999) (noting the effective use
of Rule 11 motions to limit plaintiff civil rights actions).
17. See Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 975 P.2d 231, 238
(Kan. 1999); Adam v. MacDonald Page & Co., 644 A.2d 461, 464 (Me. 1994); Kassis v.
Teachers' Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 717 N.E.2d 674, 677 (N.Y. 1999); Sargent County Bank v.
Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862, 871 (N.D. 1993).
18. See D. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 3.
19. This is a perspective which I have frequently observed practitioners share with law
students: "Legal ethics and professional responsibility are the most important topics you
will study in law school, because they affect you directly, and not just your clients' interests." Several commentators have made a similar argument. See Kathleen Clark, The Legacy
of WatergateforLegal Ethics Instruction, 51 HAsT.LJ. 673, 675 (2000); Russell Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law Schoo4 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.
REV. 719, 722 (1998) [hereinafter Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously]. In my experience, this
argument has remarkably little persuasive appeal to students.
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ing to law students than the former externally-focused topics, and may
20
account in part for the poor track record of legal ethics courses. I
suspect two reasons for the lack of interest. To the extent that the
message is: "You need this to keep the bar off your back, so you're the
client here," students correctly perceive that bar discipline is a pretty
rare phenomenon, particularly in the context of the topics that legal
ethics courses tend to emphasize. 2 1 On the other hand, to the extent
that the message is: "You need this because you will be the only arbiter
about what is right, so essentially you're the judge here," students, I suspect, worry less about the risk of error under those circumstances, at
least in the classroom setting. 22 By contrast, when students face challenging, if private, professional responsibility choices in a true representational setting, such as a law school clinic, their engagement in
23
the topic is profound.
20. As commentators note repeatedly, legal ethics and professional responsibility
courses are not well respected in the academy. See, e.g.,
Roger C. Cramton & Susan P.
Koniak, Rule, Story and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV.
145, 146 (1996) (stating that "legal ethics remains an unloved orphan of legal education,"
and that many law teachers "remain convinced that the subject is unteachable"); Bruce
Green, Less Is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 357, 357 (1998);
David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO.J.
LEGAL ETHICS 31, 37-38 (1995) (stating that "the legal ethics course is-not to put too fine
a point on it-the dog of the curriculum, despised by students, taught by overworked
deans or underpaid adjuncts and generally disregarded by the faculty at large"); Pearce,
Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 19, at 723; William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal
Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 65 (1991) [hereinafter Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics].
21. Bar discipline tends to follow from stealing client money and from unthinkable
sloppiness or conflicts of interest. The bar disciplinary authorities are far too understaffed
and overworked to attend to more ordinary, but clearly unlawful, confidentiality, conflicts,
or deception breaches. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS,
at § 110 cmt. b (2000) (observing that "disciplinary enforcement against frivolous litigation
is rare"); Elizabeth Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, A Case Study, 69 FORDHAM
L. REv. 817, 819 (2000); Amy Mashburn, ProfessionalismAs Class Ideology: Civility Codes and
Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 657, 704 n.255 (1994).
22. Much of the doctrine of professional responsibility trains the lawyer to make decisions in a role where she will be the judge. Her audience, as it were, is herself. The risk of
being wrong is not a public one, as it would be in torts (where her mistake in judgment
would be known to an opposing lawyer and perhaps to a judge), but a private one. I suspect that, rather than transforming this topic into a more compelling learning experience
for a law student, this fact renders the topic less interesting, at least in a classroom setting.
23. Many commentators have noted the benefits of teaching ethics in a clinical setting. See, e.g., Anthony E. Alfieri, Ethical Commitments, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 199 (1996);
Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759, 1770 (1993); Luban
& Millemann, supra note 20, at 40; Joan L. O'Sullivan et al., Ethical Decisionmakingand Ethics
Instruction in ClinicalLaw Practice, 3 CLINICAL L. REv. 109, 142-44 (1996).
I have taught for many years in a civil clinic where students represent poor clients in
actual disputes. Our course assigns students the classic interviewing and counseling text by
Binder, Bergman and Price. See D. BINDER ET AL., LAwYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CEN-
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There is a second way in which legal ethics is not just like torts,
and it involves the role of one's "personal"2 4 values in a law school
curriculum. As a substantive doctrine, torts, it is fair to say, implicates
deep questions of value and moral judgment.2 5 Courts which favor
more liberal compensation of victims reflect different moral judgments compared to courts which shift the costs of accidents to the
injured parties.2 6 Questions of personal responsibility, of fairness, of
justice, and of efficiency abound in this substantive area. One can easily imagine 27 a student enrolled in a torts class who has arrived at law
school with strongly held beliefs about each of these moral topics, and
who sees important issues to debate in the class. The student's value
judgments will play a critical role in the analysis of the doctrine, but
when the rubber hits the road, when the instrumental goals of the
course kick in, those value judgments are far less important. To represent his clients effectively, this student needs to know how those
value judgments have been made (that is, what are the common law
28
or statutory trends) and how he can use the resulting doctrine.
Let's now move next door to the ethics class. Like in torts, the
doctrine of professional responsibility is imbued with rich moral questions, the suggested resolutions of which may or may notjibe with the
sentiments the students assimilated before enrolling in school. The
TERED APPROACH (1990). That text preaches a client-centered philosophy, and students try
to implement it in their work. The students, though, almost to a person, find the theory of
client-centeredness much harder to implement in practice, where they often feel a very
strong desire to act paternalistically. See, e.g., Mark Spiegel, The Story of Mr. G: Reflections
upon the Questionably Competent Client, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1179 (2000) (describing one
such case). My consistent experience is that students struggle deeply and genuinely with
this issue, even though there is no sanction from anyjudge or opposing lawyer were they to
choose the "wrong" approach.
24. See infra notes 93-110 and accompanying text for a modest challenge to the notion that values ought to be described as "personal."
25. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in
Action, 35 LAw & Soc'v REv. 275 (2001). While I have been using the example of torts to
make my comparisons, there is no magic to that randomly-chosen example. Any law school
doctrinal course-property, contracts, criminal law or procedure, constitutional law, and
so on-would fit just as well as an example for comparison.
26. See, e.g., John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical
Tort Law and the CooperativeFirstpartyInsuranceMovement, 114 HARv. L. REv. 690, 705 (2001).
27. I do not teach torts, so I may be assuming too much here.
28. It is also likely (although this is in fact a pure guess) that a student's preordained
value judgments about, say, the role of personal responsibility in allocating the costs of
accidents within the tort system will be relatively open to reexamination as the novice legal
trainee learns about the complicated tort doctrine for the first time. My guess in contrasting this process to the experience in an ethics course is that the student's openness to
reexamination is less likely in the latter setting, because the activities seem more "personal." See infta notes 111-13 and accompanying text.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

courses look similar in that respect, but in one respect they may be
critically different. Unlike the torts experience, when the rubber hits
the road in the professional responsibility course, it may be much
more difficult to ask the student to forget, for now, his existing moral
sentiments as he acts in the lawyer's role. For this reason, it seems
more likely that objections about imposed values and relativist conceptions will surface more frequently in legal ethics discussions than
in tort doctrine discussions. In other words, it is one thing to conclude
a torts dialogue with the advice, "I can understand your arguments
about efficiency and fairness in this strict liability context. You do see,
though, that the Restatement and the common law trends go in the
opposite direction, right?" It is entirely different to conclude a classroom legal ethics discussion with something like this: "I hear and understand quite clearly your arguments that by carefully saying only
literally true statements you have not 'lied,' even if you may have misled your audience, and therefore you cannot be criticized for getting a
rather generous settlement from your opponent in the negotiation. In
fact, what you did was indeed 'lying,' and it was wrong." 29 I do not
mean to imply that the latter statement by the professor is inappropriate; in fact, I believe it is quite right.3 0 My point is that the latter conversation is much more likely to induce objections or worries about
"indoctrination," "imposing values," and relativism. We reach those
31
objections below.

Before proceeding to the more central purposes of ethics instruction and conversation, we ought to highlight one other goal achieved
by such a focus on the law of lawyering. Teaching substantive Restatement-like law to students, in addition to offering instrumental tools
for representation, conveys messages about value orientations
adopted by, or inherent within the organization of, the legal profes29. I draw this example from the rich critique of misleading in negotiation offered by
Gerald Wetlaufer. See Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiation, 75 IOWA L. REv.
1219 (1990). See also Reed Elizabeth Loder, Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator,8
GEOJ. LEGAL ETHICS 45 (1994).

30. Of course, the dialogue cannot be as stark as I have left it in my example. Simply
defining a moral conclusion as wrong is pure dogmatism and has no justification. But
carefully reasoning through with a student the arguments, justifications, and precedents
about the use of deception to gain benefits that could not be gained without deception is
an entirely proper role of ethics education. Just as a law professor would not hesitate to
conclude that a student's reading of Supreme Court doctrine is flawed, and tell the student
so, the professor may similarly offer judgments about the analysis of ethics questions. See
Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489 (1999) [hereinafter
Tremblay, The New Casuistry]. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 78-125 and accompanying text.
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sion.3 2 Those orientations likely will play an important role in the

moral deliberation of lawyers, who frequently adjust sentiments drawn
from ordinary citizenry activity to conform to professional contexts
and demands.
B.

33

"It's Like What the Bioethicists Do": Training for Moral
Deliberation

A commonly offered ambition for legal ethics instruction is "to
channel lawyers' behavior in socially desirable ways." 34 The argument

proceeds roughly as follows: Observers of the legal profession report
substantial evidence that the standards of practice are far less honorable than they should be. 35 Something needs to be done by the profession and by those who train the professionals to improve the ethical

quality of its practitioners. One important remedy is to rethink and
36
strengthen ethics instruction within law schools.
In considering the relationship between ethics instruction and
lawyer behavior, however, we encounter an intriguing phenomenon.
The professionalism movement 37 and its accompanying fears about
the "crisis" 38 within the profession tend to describe lawyers acting
badly. The stories are well known and all too common.3 9 A Houston
law firm enabled the Enron Corporation to craft its plausibly legal
32. See W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and ProfessionalResponsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Wendel, Public Values].
33. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, LawyeringforJustice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 116 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE, AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988));

David Luban, Partisanship,Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to
Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004 (1990); W. Bradley Wendel, ProfessionalRoles and
Moral Agency, 89 GEO. L.J. 667 (2001) (reviewing ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999)); Wendel,

Public Values, supra note 32, at 26-27.
34. W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 113, 114
(2000) [hereinafter Wendel, Value Pluralism]. See also D. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUS-

TICE, supra note 3, at 200-03; Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 19, at 728.
35. See ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, "IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:" A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243
(1986) (known widely as the "Stanley Report"). See also sources cited supra note 3.
36. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 19, at 720-21; Clark, supra note 19, at
675-76.
37. See Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 261-63; Pearce, Professionalism
Paradigm Shift, supra note 3, at 1230.
38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
39. Marianne Jennings collects lawyer headlines, and she reports the following news
items about the profession:
We steal client funds; we get involved in drug rings and occasional murder; we
form gaggles to besiege companies with class actions and punitive damage suits
over certain practices; we don't care whether you are guilty or innocent; we can
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reporting and incorporation plans which enriched management while
costing ordinary shareholders and employees a lifetime of investments
and pensions, 40 much like lawyers worked with OPM to bilk its lenders41 and with Lincoln Savings & Loan to mislead investors and fed-

eral regulators. 42 So-called "Rambo" lawyers act like 'jerks" 43 by
aggressively and deceptively exploiting well-intended discovery or procedural devices to thwart principled inquiry and fair hearing on the
merits. 44 Aggressive and insensitive lawyers representing the manufacturer of a flawed, potentially deadly birth control device cross examine
women users of the device about their sexual and bathroom habits. 45
A lawyer in a deposition sneers at his opposing counsel with the
words, "Don't 'Joe' me, asshole. You can ask some questions, but get
off that. I'm tired of you. You could gag a maggot off a meat wagon. '46
And so on.
The prevailing theme of the criticism of this kind of lawyering
behavior is one of greedy or insensitive lawyers paying insufficient at-

help you avoid your obligations; and we can help you make a little dough by
leaking information.
Marianne M. Jennings, The Model Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility Have Absolutely Nothing to Do With Ethics: The Wally Cleaver Proposition as an Alternative, 1996 Wisc. L.
REv. 1223, 1225.
40. See Diana B. Henriques with Kurt Eichenwald, A Fog Over Enron, and the Legal Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, January 27, 2002, at § 3, p. 1 (reporting on the Houston law firm of
Vinson & Elkins). See also William Powers, Jr., Report of Special Investigation Committee of
Enron Corporation (Feb. 1, 2002), availableat http://nytimes.com/images/2002/02/03/
business/03powers.pdf.
41. See OPM Leasing Services, Inc., in THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS (Phillip
Heymann & Lance Liebman eds., 1988). See also Feldman, supra note 5, at 924-25.
42. The charges lodged by the Office of Thrift Supervision against the Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays, & Handler law firm after their aggressive representation of Lincoln Savings
& Loan have been documented in many sources. See, e.g.,JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD
PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 147-51 (1997). See
also William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candorand the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 243 (1998); David Wilkins, Making
Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1145, 1163 (1993).
43. See Wendel, Value Pluralism, supra note 34, at 121 n.24 (referring to the lawyer in
Williams v. General Motors Corp., 158 F.R.D. 510 (M.D. Ga. 1993), who sought sanctions
against opposing counsel for missing a deposition appearance because of a seriously ill
father, as "a jerk").
44. See, e.g.,
Gideon Kanner, Welcome Home Rambo: High-Minded Ethics and Low-Down
Tactics in the Courts, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 81, 83 (1991); Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of
Justice: Taming Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REv. 7, 50 (1987).
45. See MORTON MINTz, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON
SHIELD 194-95 (1985), quoted in STEPHEN GILLER, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF
LAw AND ETHICS 384-85 (3d ed. 1992).
46. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 54 (Del.
1994) (reporting a transcript of the words of Texas lawyer Joseph D. Jamail).
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tention to the interests of harmed third parties, 47 the standards of
49
common morality, 48 and their own sense of moral integrity.
What should intrigue us about these stories is that in medical ethics circles, where professionals encounter an equally rich mix of ethical challenges, the stories one hears are seldom about bad doctors,
psychiatrists, or nurses. Instead, the rich literature and thoughtful debates within bioethics 50 tend to assume good faith, well-meaning actors trying their very best, amid much moral uncertainty, to come to
the right or best decision, all things considered. 5 1 The doctors or
nurses who make wrong decisions are not 'jerks" or "whores"; they
52
simply didn't think things through well enough.
This comparison to the bioethicists suggests an important distinction that is seldom explicit in legal ethics literature. 53 The oft-heard
stories about bad lawyers may dominate the discourse, but those bad
lawyers are not the only, or even the primary, audience for legal ethics
and moral deliberation conversations. Indeed, it might be that the
most significant goal for ethics education is not to rehabilitate the unscrupulous lawyers, but to aid the good faith lawyers. The stories in
this area may be less provocative, but they are likely far more common
in day to day practice.
47. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHics 123-35 (1998); Joseph Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on
Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1107 (1998).
48. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 110 (1988); David
B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and ProfessionalResponsibility, 57 MD.L. REV.

1502, 1567 (1998).
49.

See Eleanor Myers, "Simple Truths" About Moral Education, 45 Am. U. L. REV. 823,

824-25 (1996); Serena Steir, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO
(1991).

ST.

L.J. 551, 553

50. One footnote can hardly do justice to the wealth of scholarship addressing applied ethics in medicine and health care. For a sampling of some of the most common
bioethics resources, see, for example, TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES
OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 17 (4th ed. 1994); GLENN C. GRABER & DAVID C. THOMASMA, THEORY
AND PRACTICE IN MEDICAL ETHICS

97 (1989);

ALBERT

R. JONSEN

ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS:

A

PRACTICAL APPROACH To ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE (4th. ed. 1998); KuCZEWSKI, supra note 10; CLINICAL ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (B. Hoffmaster et al. eds.,
1989); FOUR PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS 319, 326 (Raanan Gillon ed., 1994).
51. SeeJONSEN ET AL., supra note 50, at 8-10.
52. One possible exception to the generalizations I develop in the text is the increasing concern about potential conflicts of interest within the medical research institutions,

particularly regarding the influence of funding sources on research agendas and reporting
of results. See, e.g., MichaelJ. Malinowski, Institutional Conflicts and Responsibilitiesin an Age of
Academic-Industry Alliances, 8 WIDENER L. SyMp. J. 47, 56 (2001).
53. An exception is the work of Bradley Wendel. See W. Bradley Wendel, Morality,
Motivation, and the ProfessionalMovement, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 557, 558 (2001).
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"It's Perhaps a Little like Therapy or Prison or Salvation": The
Sociopath Thesis

The third goal of legal ethics discourse and teaching is arguably
different from the one just described. Like bioethicists, legal ethicists

ought to develop methods and practices to aid good faith lawyers to

deliberate better about moral choices.5 4 But unlike the bioethicists, 5
the legal ethicists claim an additional agenda-to minimize the population of, or the harm caused by, what we might refer to as the
"felons,"56 "whores,"5 7 and 'Jerks '' 58 within the profession. Getting the
bad people to be not so bad, then, seems an explicit purpose of legal
ethics instruction. 59 In this way the educators' role is not unlike that of
therapists, or jailers, or clerics-they aspire to rehabilitate the bad
folks, or (more sympathetically) the folks who do bad things.
Noting this apparent purpose of ethics pedagogy invites the obvious inquiry: Is there some reason to believe that the troublesome behavior of the felons, whores, and jerks might be improved if their
54. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 941.
55. I do not intend to underestimate the institutional and role-driven bases for the
differences between the professions. The ethical predicaments encountered by physicians
tend to involve competing visions of good-between, say, a goal of beneficence and one of
autonomy. See, e.g.,
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 50, at 38. The professional's personal interests (financial or performance-driven) are not apparently in play. Lawyering
predicaments more often pose a caring posture against a hurtful one, with the lawyer's
interests usually aligned with the hurtful alternative (for that is the option which benefits
the lawyer's client). In this respect legal ethics resembles more closely business ethics, with
stark antagonism between owners' and employees' or consumers' interests, than bioethics.
Even recognizing the role-driven explanations for the differences between legal ethics and
bioethics, the questions about the role of deliberative skill in improving lawyers' behaviors
remain important ones.
56. See infra note 62. See alsoJennings, supra note 39, at 1223 (noticing that "we lawyers
were engaging in the type of behavior that often runs deep into felony behavior"); Lisa
Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHiCS 205, 209-10, 211-14 (1999) [hereinafter Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking] (describing lawyers convicted of billing fraud and listing their prison sentences where
appropriate).
57. See Wendel, Morality and Motivation, supra note 53, at 601. See also infra note 70. I
use the word "whore" in this Article with some trepidation. I intend it as a term of condemnation, describing a professional who would sell out his principles and his integrity for
money and power. I do not, however, intend to cast aspersions on true prostitutes, those
men or women who engage in sex for money. Their behaviors are, at least arguably, less
flatly condemnable. See, e.g., Beverly Balos, Teaching ProstitutionSeriously, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REv. 709 (2001); Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming
Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1220 (1999). I suppose what I am saying here is that by calling
some lawyers whores I do not intend to insult prostitutes by association.
58. See supra note 43.
59. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 940-41; Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note
19, at 723; Wendel, Morality and Motivation, supra note 53, at 558.
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understanding of moral deliberation were better?60 There is no doubt
that the legal profession and graduate educational institutions frequently assume an affirmative answer to that question. Consider a
prominent manifestation of this proposition. In 1987, with the insider
trading and junk bond scandals involving colorful figures like Ivan
Boesky and Michael Milken firmly in mind, then-Securities and Exchange Commission Chair John Shad donated $20 million to Harvard
Business School for business ethics education. 61 "I've been very disturbed by the great number of leading business and law school graduates becoming felons," Shad said at the time of his gift.62 Harvard
Business School, which we probably should assume did not take the
money from Shad while convinced that such training was a waste of
time and resources, either led, or was carried along by, a trend in that
era on the part of business schools to emphasize social responsibility
63
concerns amid its more conventional profit maximization training.
Similar sentiments have driven ethics education in law school.
The 197 0s Watergate scandals apparently prompted law schools to require professional responsibility in their curriculum. 64 The fact that
institutions respond to reports of troublesome behavior with recommendations to teach about ethics does not mean, obviously, that the
suggested cure has any connection to the purported disease. There is
an open invitation to skepticism here, heard from time to time in the
literature. 65 Did John Shad really believe that Ivan Boesky's criminal

60. See Clark, supra note 19, at 677 (asking this question and suggesting a qualified
affirmative answer); Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously, supra note 19, at 739 (the same).
61. Robert Lenzner, SEC Chairman to Donate $20 Million to Harvardfor Business Ethics
Program, THE BOSTON GLOBE, March 31, 1987, available at 1987 WL 3970954.

62. Id.
63. See Business Schools' Assignment: Think About Ethical Questions, Associated Press, BosTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1988 (reporting on efforts at Harvard Business School, University of
Pennsylvania's Wharton School, Columbia University, and University of Virginia to enhance ethics instruction). This agenda has its advocates in law school business education.
See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, There's a Forest in Those Trees: Teaching about the Role of Corporations
in Society, 34 GA. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (2000) (advocating an increased emphasis on stakeholder interests and corporate social responsibility in law school business courses).
64. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 19, at 673; Pearce, TeachingEthics Seriously, supra note 19,
at 722; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RiGHTS 1,
2 (1975).
65. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, Wanted: An Ethos of Personal Responsibility-Why
Codes of Ethics and Schools ofLaw Don't Makefor Ethical Lawyers, 21 CONN. L. REV. 365, 365-82
(1989); James E. Moliterno, In-House Live-Client Clinical Programs: Some Ethical Issues, 67
FoRDHAM L. REV. 2377, 2386-87 (1999);James W. Perkins, Virtues and the Lawyer, 38 CATH.
LAw. 185, 195-96 (1998).
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activities 6 6 were the result of inadequate instruction in business school
classes? 67 It does seem fair to draw a distinction between brazenly illegal behavior and worrisome but borderline unethical behavior, 68 and
it then seems not a little naive to suggest that felons and law breakers
69
just need a good dose of compulsory chapel.
But this pot shot may be misplaced. Briefly stated, the response
goes something like this: It must be that the cretins we so dislike either mean to do well but just screw up (in which case better training
just might help), or they really don't mean to do well in the first place,
which is to say they are sociopathic (in which case better training is
less likely to have any effect, unless ethics training can motivate the
sociopaths).
But here's the difficulty. It may be true that the felons, the
whores, and the jerks are at bottom uninterested in considerations of
fairness, justice, or what might be "the good." It may be true that, if a
critic were to buttonhole one of these folks, the lawyer would answer
the critic's complaints with something to the effect of "Sorry, bub. I
agree with you about the injustice, the unfairness, and the cruelty of
what I do, but I simply don't give a flying fig. I just do not care." But I'll
bet, and you'll likely agree, that the critics are not going to hear such
words from those lawyers. 70 When buttonholed, those lawyers will de66. Boesky pled guilty to one felony count for securities fraud. SeeJAMES B. STEWART,
DEN OF THIEVES 420 (1992); Omri Yadlin, Is Stock ManipulationBad? Questioning The Conventional Wisdom With Evidence From The IsraeliExperience, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 839, 840
(2001).
67. Actually, the fact that Shad worried about too many Harvard Business School
graduates becoming "felons" might imply some belief in that proposition-that somehow
criminal (as opposed to unethical) behaviors might be deterred by better ethics instruction.
See Lenzner, supra note 61.
68. John Dean is reported to have made that distinction after Watergate: "Iknew that
the things I was doing were wrong, and one learns the difference between right and wrong
long before one enters law school. A course in legal ethics wouldn't have changed anything." D. Goldman, "Exclusive Interview with John Dean," Comment, Boston University
School of Law 1 (1979), quoted in Wendel, Morality and Motivation, supra note 53, at 602
n.243.
69. See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalismin ProfessionalSchools, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
193, 195 (1999) (responding to the charge that "[s]tudents either have it or they don't, and
postgraduate training is an empty proposition. As Eric Schnapper once put it, legal ethics
'like politeness on subways... and fidelity in marriage' cannot be acquired through classroom moralizing," quoting Eric Schnapper, The Myth of Legal Ethics, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1978, at
202, 205.
70. See Wendel, Morality and Motivation, supra note 53, at 601 (lawyers asked about
questionable conduct "did not say, 'Yeah, I'm a whore. I'm only in it for the money.' The
justifications they offered related to considerations of justice, fairness, political legitimacy,
and loyalty to clients .... ."). See also Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U.
L. REv. 333, 338 (2001) ("Most individuals want to perceive themselves and be perceived by
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fend what they did with arguments, whether persuasive or not, that
connect to shared norms within the profession.
The obvious response by the skeptics at this point is: "Of course!
But can't you see that these felons, whores, and jerks are lying?
They're sociopaths, after all, so they'd hardly worry about lying." We
have to accept that explanation as entirely possible. It is easy for sociopaths to pretend that they are not sociopaths, and given some of the
strained arguments the critics might hear, the suspicions about dissembling might be rather high. But this need to dissemble is telling
for two reasons. First, and perhaps less interesting, this reality means
that the critics, and the teachers, will never be able confidently to
identify the sociopaths. They will look very much like the good faith
but stumbling lawyer who just gets it wrong, and offers weak arguments because his skill at this deliberative reasoning stuff is not so
great. Second, and more interesting it seems, the very need of the
felons, whores, and jerks to dissemble with arguments communicates
something about the nature of community norms and their effect on
behavior. Rambo doesn't need to lie, so why would he do so? He may
be willing to act like a sociopath, but it's very hard for him to admit
being a sociopath, because his community of peers will not accept that
level of immorality.
We return to this question in Part IV of this Article. In that Part
we explore further the various guises under which the felons, whores,
and jerks might appear, in an effort to discern whether professional
schools, or professional trade associations, might play some role in
influencing their behaviors. 7 1 For the next two Parts we return to the
realm of moral deliberation, assuming here that the audience cares
about doing this ethics stuff right.
II.

Deliberation About Values

Let us assume, for the next two Parts, that law students and lawyers are likely motivated to be as good as they can be, all things considothers as being motivated by moral values like generosity, honor and honesty and not just
by the prospect of material gain."). Rob Atkinson may disagree. He argues that "unscrupulous Type I [hired gun, or 'Rambo'] lawyers ... do not justify their Type I behavior by
even a self-serving reference to dubious theories; they do not try to justify it at all." Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 306. His reference for this statement, however,
offers only "an exception that proves the rule." Id. at n.202 (recounting a Skadden Arps
lawyer's claim that "I'm at Skadden now. We pride ourselves on being assholes. It's part of
the firm culture," quoting LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A
LEGAL EMPIRE 241 (1993)).
71. See text accompanying infra notes 217-37.
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ered. 72 It is possible, I suppose, that simply by wantingto be as good as
she can be, an individual can be trusted to make reliable, centered,
and correct moral choices-but that supposition is unlikely. We would
suppose, instead, that good faith persons can learn how to deliberate
better, in order to make superior moral choices, 7 3 and that they ought
to study how to do so. At this juncture, though, some difficulties appear. There seems to be consensus among writers in this area that
students and lawyers ought to learn an art often described as "deliberative (or reflective) judgment"-that is, how to recognize moral questions, how to parse their components, and how to weigh important
moral considerations in context.7 4 Seldom, though, is the suggestion
made that students and lawyers can learn some right answers, or how
to balance appropriately competing claims about what might be right.
Teaching a sense of reflective judgment is viewed as an altogether
good thing; teaching specific values, by contrast, is worrisome.7 5 Certain nagging doubts about personal values, about moral pluralism,
and about one's ethical identity seem to predominate. "There are no
right or wrong answers," one frequently hears, "but there are better or
worse answers." 76 The critique continues, if values are to be taught,
"whose values" will those be? 77

In this Part we examine some of the underlying sources for the
doubts about identifying, and working from, shared values. I conclude
72. See SIMON BLACKBURN, BEING GOOD: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 7 (2000) (noting
the difference between "moralists" and ordinary persons who may not always be perfectly
good).
73. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 19, at 676; Feldman, supra note 5, at 941.
ANTHONY T.KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
74. See, e.g.,
PROFESSION 15-16 (1993); Paul Brest & Linda Kreiger, On TeachingProfessionalJudgment,69
WASH. L. REV. 527 (1994); Clark, supra note 19, at 676; Feldman, supra note 5, at 904-05;
Gutmann, supra note 23, at 1765; Luban & Millemann, supra note 20, at 39. See also Alexander Scherr, Lawyers And Decisions: A Model Of PracticalJudgment, 47 VILL. L. REV. 161 (2002)
(developing a model of judgment for lawyering tasks generally).
75. Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An Overview of
Teaching ProfessionalResponsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 76 (1991) ("[I] t seems inappropriate for law schools to promote particular values. To do so would be to assume that values
are universal or that those embodied in the professional role are uncontroversial."); Lee
Modjeska, On Teaching Morality to Law Students, 41J. LEGAL EDUC. 71, 71, 73 (1991) (teaching morality "raises the specter of moral pontification ....Law teaching.., is not a bully
pulpit.").
76. See, e.g., DEBORAH RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. ETHICS By THE PERVASIVE
METHOD 15 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter RHODE, ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD]; Clark,
supra note 19, at 675-76.
77. See WHOSE VALUES? THE BATTLE FOR MORALITY IN PLURALISTIC AMERICA 2 (Carl
Horn ed., 1985). Cf Susan H. Bitensky, A ContemporaryProposalfor Reconciling the Free Speech
Clause with CurricularValues Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769, 777
(1995) ("Whose values should be taught?").
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that, unless one accepts a relativist or subjectivist perspective about
values-a position with few real world defenders-the prevailing conception of non-comparable, personal values is an unwarranted one.
A.

The Relativism Worry

The first, and perhaps the least troublesome, objection comes
from the relativists. When the topic turns to questions of value a student might object: "I'm sorry, but how can we talk about values here?
My values may be very different from your values, and nothing we can
say here can persuade me that you are right and I am wrong. Let's talk
about law, which we can study, but not values, which are only in our
78
heads."
This is hardly the place for an in-depth exploration of the relativism controversy, which has engaged scholars for centuries. 79 For our
purposes, it suffices to note that the crude relativism argument just
presented, which Bernard Williams calls "vulgar relativism,"80 is either
incoherent, or irrelevant. Its incoherence stems from its implicit expression of reasons (I will act this way because my individual values
support such action) while denying, at the same moment, that those
reasons have any intersubjective validity. If the relativist's values serve
as a basis for acting (and what else would they do?), the values imply
some form of shared norms which give the reasons some substance. 8 1
If, on the other hand, the relativist denies this apparent truth, then
her position is irrelevant. It is irrelevant both because no conversation
with her will have any purpose, and because, frankly, she doesn't ex-

ist.82 Even the most passionate defender of the "it's my opinion" argu-

ment will have reasons for her opinion, and once there are reasons,
there are arguments, and efforts to make others understand why the
78. This argument is not one presented by relativist scholars, but it is one sometimes
heard among plain persons, including law students and lawyers. SeeJeremy Waldron, On the
Objectivity of Morals: Thoughts on Gilbert's Democratic Individuality, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1361,
1373-74 (1992) [hereinafter Waldron, Objectivity of Morals] ("Although relativism appears
to be a very popular position among nonphilosophers, it is notoriously difficult to formulate in philosophically rigorous terms.").
79. See, e.g., DAVID WONG, MORAL RELATIVITY (1984). The most serious recent defense
of a form of relativism appears in the work of neo-pragmatists. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Almost
Pragmatism:The Jurisprudenceof RichardPosner, RichardRorty, and Ronald Dworkin, in PRAGMATISM IN LAw & SOCIETY 47 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991). For a critique of
the relativism emanating from pragmatism and some strains of postmodernism, see Eric
Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74 TEX. L. REV. 523 (1996).
80. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 159, 219 n.2 (1985).
81. See BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 27-29.
82. Cf Blumenson, supra note 79, at 541 n.58 (arguing the incoherence of a relativist
reasoning process).
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reasons make sense, and then something other than relativism is go83
ing on.

There is a more credible version of relativism which I should note
in passing but which need not concern us here. A much more serious
debate grapples with the prospect of cultural relativism and "universalizability" of moral judgments. Richard Posner, for instance, has argued that "[i]nfanticide is abhorred in our culture, but routine in
societies that lack the resources to feed all the children that are
born. '84 He thus concludes that infanticide is not necessarily "wrong"
in any absolute sense. Many writers, like Posner, wonder whether all
deeply held notions of the good are culturally driven, and question
whether one can justifiably critique a different culture for practices
accepted as immoral here. 85 Those arguments, even if persuasive,
have little place in the debates within the legal profession about how
lawyers may act honorably. The cultural relativism arguments seem to
assume strong norms within one culture, and question the applicability of those norms elsewhere. Those arguments in this way tend to
support the positions developed here, which look for common,
shared norms among those who worry about lawyers' ethics.
Another reason to minimize relativism as a serious worry for professional ethics conversations is that even avowed relativists tend to
join in common discourse when the topic comes around to the most
glaring cruelties or injustices. For instance, even the envelope-pushing
Judge Posner, a prominent defender of a deep version of relativism,
seems unable to sustain his relativist thesis when confronted with com86
pelling, real tragedy.
83.

See BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 28.

84.

Posner, Problematics, supra note

7,

at

1650.

Posner

would

"hesitate

to

call . . . immoral . . . a person who sincerely claimed, with or without supporting arguments, that it is right to kill infants ... ." Id. at 1644.
85. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND
ABROAD (1996). For responses to those arguments, see WILLIAMS, Supra note 80; Blumen-

son, supra note 79.
86. A few years after his Holmes Lectures in which he defended infanticide and slavery as not necessarily morally wrong given the right local community norms, see supra note
7, Posner demonstrated the real challenge in adhering to a relativist (or subjectivist)
stance. In a recent column in The Atlantic Monthly, Posner quotes an American historian
and offers his response to the historian's views:
[The historian writes:] "I'm not sure which is more frightening: the horror that
engulfed New York City [on September 11, 2001] or the apocalyptic rhetoric emanating daily from the White House." Come again? Can this really be a difficult
choice? One is reminded of Martin Heidigger's saying that although the extermination of the Jews was bad, so is mechanized agriculture.
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The Role of Faith

If relativism falls short as an intellectual objection to values talk
within professional education, arguments grounded in religious faith
are equally beside the point. This is not to assert, of course, that the
role of faith is not considerable in its influence on many lawyers' and

students' views of morality. 87 Any such claim would be just silly. But
arguments based on faith can never be persuasive to those who do not

share the proponent's religious beliefs;8 8 faith based arguments are
persuasive when they reach a shared core of sentiment about what is
to be valued. Those who argue that, for instance, Jesuit education offers a more sustained moral vision than secular education 89 may well
be right, but the moral values taught by Jesuit or Catholic institutions

are profound and meaningful not because they are Jesuit or Catholic,
but because they are profound and meaningful.
A religious ethicist does not make the argument that her beliefs
are good simply because they are her beliefs as propounded from on
high.9 0 A purely scriptural argument is one we simply will not hear:
I don't care what you say to me about, and indeed I accept your
arguments about, cruelty, unfairness, disrespect, inequality, and
the like-I value "X," notwithstanding its cruelty and injustice, because my God tells me I must value "X," and what my God tells me
is absolute truth to me and binding on me.

As Simon Blackburn writes, "The point is that God, or the gods, are
not to be thought of as arbitrary.They have to be regarded as selecting
Richard A. Posner, The ProfessorsProfess, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, February 2002, at 28 (quoting
Eric Foner). There is no question that Posner's disagreement with Foner (and his use of
the Heidigger story) is a normative one, and Posner uses arguments in an effort to persuade
his readers that on the normative question he is assuredly right-that it is worse, morally,
to kill 3000 innocent civilians by crashing airplanes into two skyscrapers than to engage in
apocalyptic rhetoric about evil and war. This is moral argument, pure and simple, by a selfproclaimed relativist. See Nussbaum, supra note 7, at 1787 ("[I1s Posner really a relativist at
all?").
87. See, e.g., Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1253 (1998); Monroe H. Freedman, Religion is Not Totally Irrelevant to
Legal Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299 (1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics andJurisprudence from within Religious Congregations33 U. TOL. L. Rv.91 (2001).
88.

See BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 10.

89. See Mark A. Sargent, An Alternative to the Sectarian Vision: The Role of the Dean in an
Inclusive Catholic Law School 33 U. TOL. L. Rv.171, 188 (2001) ("realization of Catholic
identity can indeed be one such antidote" to "anomie"). Cf Mack A. Player, StrangerIn a
Strange Land: Baptist Dean of a Jesuit Law School 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 143, 145 (2001)
(stressing the Jesuit values of service and commitment to justice).
90. Simon Blackburn offers an example from Plato's Dialogues to make this point.
]
Socrates develops the circularity of Euthyphro's argument that "[piety is loved because it
is holy, not holy because it is loved." BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 15-16.
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the right things to allow and to forbid." 9 1 The important question, for
religious as well as non-religious professionals, is discerning what
92
those "right" things are.
C.

The Role of "Personal" Values

Few respected applied ethics writers defend a deeply relativist
stance, as we have seen. 93 A purely subjectivist stance has even less currency. 94 So it does not surprise us that we seldom, if ever, hear arguments like this:
I happen to believe deeply that it is entirely right for a lawyer to
bribe a judge, forge documents, and offer perjured testimony on
behalf of a wealthy corporate client in order to win an entirely
trumped-up foreclosure case against a working class family
with
95
sick children and nowhere else to live. Just my opinion.
By contrast, many respected applied ethics writers treat moral values as somehow "personal," 96 and suggest limits on their role within
professional education. William Simon, for instance, disparages the
role that "private or personal moralities of individual lawyers" ought
to play in ethical decisionmaking. 97 Bruce Green cautions lawyers not
to allow their personal values to influence their professional deci91. Id. at 16.
92. For an example of this point, see Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish
Perspective, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1131 (1994). Freedman writes that his legal ethics are
influenced by his Jewish traditions and their commitment to "the dignity and sanctity of
the individual, compassion for fellow human beings, individual autonomy, and equal protection of the laws." Id. at 1134. Freedman's list is evocative and compelling, and there is
little doubt that these sentiments are central in his Jewish tradition, but the goods he lists
are hardly idiosyncratic. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any community, of faith or otherwise,
not committed to those values.
93. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
94. See Posner, Problematics,supra note 7, at 1642-43 (defending a version of relativism
but denying that his arguments are subjectivist).
95. Note that we may hear arguments from a lawyer who represents a wealthy corporation foreclosing on a working class family with sick children and nowhere else to live, defending that representation. Those arguments, though, will rely on some reasons, some
principles, and some shared concepts and norms, however contestable in the circumstances of the particular case. See Charles Fried, Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 573 (1977) (offering a reasoned, principled defense of
zealous advocacy).
96. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Private Lives and Professional Responsibilities? The Relationship of Personal Morality to Lawyering and ProfessionalEthics, 21 PACE L. REv. 365, 373
(2001).
97. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, supra note 20, at 65-66. See William H. Simon,
Ethical Discretionin Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083 (1988); Simon's thesis is that lawyers
possess no common analytical and rhetorical tools for addressing personal values. See SiMON, THE PRAcrICE OFJUSTICE, supra note 47, at 18.
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sions. 98 A similar recognition of the personal nature of moral commitment is reflected in the frequent observation about the "moral
diversity" of the legal profession and the absence of shared values
among lawyers. 99 Rob Atkinson criticizes as "demonstrably erroneous
. . [the] premise that conscientious lawyers agree on the way to be a
good person and a good lawyer, or that a single kind of lawyering is
right and all others wrong,"1 00 a thesis that Atkinson labels "the fallacy
of the one true way." 10
'
The notion of "personal" values, either as a basis for lawyering
commitments 0 2 or as an impermissible distortion of those commitments, 10 3 engenders the same incoherence that surrounded the relativist arguments. A claim that values are personal implies that they are
somehow non-negotiable, that they are not based upon reasons or arguments, but just "are." That kind of offering is justly rejected when
proffered by a relativist. Why does it have such currency and validity
here? There is some good reason for the difference, but to understand that reason we must distinguish among three versions of "personal" values. With an appreciation of these distinctions, we see that
some values are "personal" in the non-negotiable way, but others are
not.
*

1.

Values As Reasoning About What Is Right

A common understanding of one's personal values treats those
concepts as beliefs about what might be correct from a moral standpoint. 10 4 Such beliefs cannot be idiosyncratic without our relying on
98. See Green, supra note 4, at 19. See also Rostain, Ethics Lost, supra note 14, at 1298
(criticizing a suggestion by some ethicists, including Geoffrey Hazard, that "[a] lawyer can
resort to her own idiosyncratic values to draw the line at which partisanship leaves off and
exogenous norms take hold"). Rostain argues that "Hazard ends up in a 'lonely subjective
world' of inchoate personal value," citing Hazard, Personal Values, supra note 4, at 141.
99. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 268, citing Timothy P. Terrell &
James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism,"41 EMoRY L.J. 403, 432 (1992). See also Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal
Profession, in LAwmRs' IDEALS/LAwYERS' PRAcriCES 14 (D. Trubek et al. eds., 1993) (the
professionalism campaigns rely on "vague and general invocation of 'shared' values that
really aren't shared"); Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11,
13 (1990) [hereinafter Schneyer, Hired Gun] (most lawyers' "personal values" are not the
same as the "progressive political values" of critics like David Luban).
100. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 303.
101. Id.
102. See Swygert, supra note 14, at 807-08, 813-14.
103. See Green, supra note 4.
104. SeeJane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructingthe Field of ProfessionalResponsibility, 15 NoTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 37, 49-50 (2001); Scherr, supra note
74, at 194.
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subjectivist or religious arguments, and hence do not warrant the protective label of "personal." Imagine: I claim that my "personal" values
forbid me from lying to gain an advantage in a particular context, the
details of which you and I understand equally well. 10 5 You respond
that your "personal" values permit you to lie in that identical circumstance. Assuming that you and I reject dogmatic relativism or subjectivism ("it's my opinion because, well, because it's my opinion") as
well as purely religious foundations for our stances ("it's my opinion
because my dogma says so, and I can't offer any other reasons"), our
values are negotiable. I offer my nuanced reasons why lying is wrong
in this case (not always wrong, perhaps, but wrong here); you respond
with your nuanced arguments in support of the lie here. We might
call our values personal, but we gain very little in doing so. They certainly gain no protection from critique or debate by that label, nor am
I out of bounds by concluding (and teaching,if I am your teacher) that
10 6
your value is ill-reasoned and, well, wrong, at least in this context.
Bruce Green has articulated the most robust defense of a distinction between personal values and professional values, arguing that the
former ought to be cabined in professional decisionmaking.1 0 7 His arguments, though, are not persuasive. His thesis is most provocative
when he imagines professionals holding idiosyncratic personal values
and applying those values in an unacceptable way. For instance, he
asks us to imagine ajudge, assigned to hear a visitation dispute involving an abusive father, calling upon his "personal belief that divorce is
immoral, as well as a religious conviction that children should respect
and revere their parents" to decide that the son should visit the father,
even though "two independent psychiatrists believe that the children
10 8
would be harmed" by the visitation.
Green's point is that the judge should not rely on these beliefs
because they are personal and religious. He is correct that the judge
should not rely on these beliefs, but not because of their source. In105. The qualification that we understand the context of the value choice at hand is
critical. See text accompanying infra note 171.
106. My argument addresses the moral assessment of your conduct, and not the legal
assessment. William Simon may be right that the latter is often more workable, and exhibits clearer shared norms, than the former, and my example here is one such instance. See
SIMON, THE PRACrICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 18. It is plainly unlawful for you as a
lawyer to lie, and my argument on that score will employ a truly shared authority, like
MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.3, 4.1 and 8.4(c) (2002), if they happen to have been
adopted in our jurisdiction. My larger point is that, the facility of the legal arguments
notwithstanding, the same reasoning often applies to moral questions.
107. See Green, supra note 4.
108. Id. at 31-32.
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stead, the judge should be faulted because his moral reasoning is simply wrong. Green's analysis is subtly, but insistently, relativist or
subjectivist. He affords the judge autonomy in his choice of values,
without offering a reasoned challenge to the acceptability of the values expressed by the judge. 10 9 His thesis implies that we cannot evaluate the acceptability of personal values, and, therefore, the safe route
is to adhere to collective professional values. The opposing thesis developed here is that we can reason through questions of value and
conclude, like we will in his example, that certain decisions are simply
11 0
wrong.
2.

Values As Reasons for Acting, Apart from Considerations About
What Is Right

The notion of personal values might mean something rather different, however, from an opinion about what is right morally. The
literature about autonomy and individual choice relies often on the
accepted understanding that individuals differ in their personal values.1 11 In this context the term "values" refers to deep preferences, or,
as David Luban has written, "reasons for acting ...that form the core
109. Green credits personal and religious norms as critical to a person's identity, see id
at 34, but understands those norms as idiosyncratic and, hence, not subject to reasoned
analysis. See id. at 23 ("unique individual moral codes"); id. at 24 ("subjective religious and
personal moral dispositions," quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Equal Opportunity in the Practiceof
Law, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 127, 128 (1990)).
110. Green offers several examples to establish his claim that the indiscriminate application of private, idiosyncratic norms is unwise. In the most provocative examples, not
surprisingly, the personal value choices conflict with the disposition offered by the profession's guidelines. (If there were no clash, we would not know that the actor had acted on
personal norms; and if the professional guidelines did not require a particular resolution
or limited set of options, the choice made would be essentially unfettered.) In each case
where the exercise of a supposed personal value led to an injustice, see id., Examples 3, at
31-32; 4, at 36; and 7, at 41, the critique in the text would apply-the injustice ought to be
avoided because it is unjust, not because of its connection to personal values. In the cases
where adherence to the professional guidelines might seem unjust, see id., Examples 2, at
30-31; and 10, at 54-55, Green's argument is even more difficult to sustain. Perhaps it is
best to allow certain injustices to occur in the interests of developing fidelity to rules, but
that conclusion would follow from a careful analysis of the rule and the circumstances, and
should not be decided because one value is deemed professional and another personal. Cf
Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962) (child's life endangered when
lawyers adhered to confidentiality rules and did not disclose aneurysm to child).
111. See, e.g.,
BINDER ET AL., supra note 23, at 18; ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D.
HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING COUNSELING & NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFcrIV
REPRESENTATION (1990); ROBERT F. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAw: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1999); David Luban, Paternalismand the
Legal Profession, 1981 Wisc. L. REv. 454 [hereinafter Luban, Paternalismand the Legal Profession]; Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice: A Contextual Approach to RepresentingSenior Citizens of QuestionableCapacity, 62 FORDHAm L. REV. 1073 (1994);Jan Ellen Rein, Clients
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of [one's] personality."'1 12 Using this view of the term "values," we have
little difficulty agreeing that they are idiosyncratic, non-negotiable
(for the most part), and "personal." But it is equally apparent that this
conception of values is different from the conception of values as sentiments about what is right. You might declare that your deep preference is to lie to gain an advantage in the case we are discussing. I am
powerless to persuade you that your preference is wrong as a statement
of your reasonsfor acting. I am not powerless or unjustified, by contrast,
in trying to persuade you that your choice is wrong as a question of
113
ethics.
3.

Values As Patterns of Response to Incommensurability

The third conception of "personal" values offers an understanding of personal normative commitments which does not presuppose
relativism or subjectivism but which may demand respect for idiosyncrasy and non-negotiable stances. This conception thus combines elements of the first two, and might support, in some settings, the
commentators' recognition of a strong diversity of moral opinions
within the legal profession.
We saw above, in discussing the first conception of personal values, that questions of right and wrong invite reason-giving, and hence
build upon a shared language and shared beliefs about normative
value. Bradley Wendel has recently explored the nature of normative
disagreement in light of the weakness of relativist arguments, and he
offers the ideas of incommensurabilityand incomparabilityas central components of moral uncertainty and conflict. 1 4 Two nonrelativists ought
to agree generally about common core values, at least in the abstract. 11 5 If multiple shared norms conflict (as they will in any instance
with Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices-What'san Attorney To Do?: Within and Beyond the
Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101 (1994).
112. Luban, Paternalismand the Legal Profession, supra note 111, at 470.
113. This understanding of "personal values" seems to mesh with the use of that phrase
to represent private behaviors which may or may not affect one's professional duties. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 96, at 369-70, 389-91 (comparing President Clinton's less
than admirable private moral conduct with his professional obligations).
114. SeeWendel, Value Pluralism,supra note 34, at 143. See also KRONMAN, supra note 74,
at 114-15 (the incommensurability of norms is a conception taught to law students, contrary to their pre-law school understanding).
115. See WALZER, supra note 85, at 1-19 (arguing that agreement in the abstract is of
very little use in moral and political disputes; "thin" descriptions might offer seeming
agreement about principles, but more complex "thick" descriptions, where several valued
principles clash, undercut any earlier agreement).
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of moral uncertainty' 6), the two conversants might still agree about
how the conflicting norms ought to be weighed or ranked,' 17 but only
if they first concur about some "covering value" which might serve as
the basis for the comparison. 118 In many instances of moral uncertainty, Wendel asserts, no such covering values can be found. Indeed,
the disagreement may well be itself about two plausible covering
values. 119

Wendel offers a "thick" example involving a dispute over whether
to develop a copper mine within the Glacier Peak Wilderness in Washington's Cascade range.1 20 He argues that the choice between developing the mine and leaving the Wilderness pristine implicates serious
moral concerns about which observers will disagree. The disagreements will not be ones of mere "opinion," for the arguments about
which side is right will rely on reason, on facts, and on common
norms which both sides accept. The difficulty, Wendel shows, is that
when the debate is exhausted the "better" answer depends on how
one ranks the two goods (economic values and jobs versus breathtaking beauty), and on that score no "reason" will suffice to persuade
121
another.
In the "tragic" instances of incomparability and an inability to define an adequate covering value, Wendel argues, the actor cannot rely
on reasoning alone, and must instead rely on his personal commitments, his character, and his life story to make the best choice he can,
all things considered. 122 Having done so, he will not (Wendel implies)
be criticized by us, or ought not be, for we cannot say that he is wrong
116. SeeJONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 8, at 330.
117. Most moral philosophers reject the idea of an ex ante lexical ordering of principles
or norms. W. D. Ross proposed a ranked order of duties, arguing that the principle of
nonmalevolence (avoiding harm) ought to take precedence over the principle of beneficence (the production of good consequences). See Ross, supra note 6, at 21-22. Few philosophers believe that the lexical ordering endeavor is a fruitful one. See Wendel, Value
Pluralism, supra note 34, at 139-41; Kai Nelson, On Being Skeptical About Applied Ethics, in
CLINICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: EXPLORATION AND ASSESSMENT 95 (Terrance F. Ackerman et al.
eds., 1987); Alasdair Maclntyre, Moral Philosophy: What's Next?, in REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 5 (Alasdair MacIntyre & Stanley Hauerwas eds., 1983)
("there are no scales" for the weighing of competing values).
118. Wendel, Value Pluralism, supra note 34, at 152 ("The possibility or impossibility of
making comparisons is intelligible only if there is some covering value in respect to which
the intrinsic merit of two items may be evaluated.").
119. See id. at 153.
120. See id. at 154-57.
121. See id. at 159 ("The point of the example is that it seems impossible to specify a
covering value that takes into account the full range of moral and prudential considerations at play in the policy dispute and tells us how they should be ranked.").
122. See id. at 160-61.
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(or that we know that he is wrong). That limit on criticism, if we accept it, might leave the observers of the present state of affairs of the
legal profession a bit more humble in their censure. We reach that
question at the end of this Article. 123
The recognition of incommensurable or incomparable norms offers support for the commentators who cabin the "personal" values
from the arena of reasoned argument. At the same time, it is important not to overstate the significance of this phenomenon. Some of
the more skeptical observers imply that all moral reasoning falls into
this incomparability camp, 124 and that conclusion is seemingly mistaken. Further, in cases of true incomparability, and perhaps Wendel's
National Wilderness mining story meets that definition, important
reasoning and argument may proceed on the legal values at stake, so
that the lawyer need not see the choice as one which he must make
entirely on his own. 125 As we shall see in the next Part, some techniques of moral reasoning, particularly casuistry, can minimize the frequency that moral conflicts end up with true conversation-stopping
incomparability.

IH.

Working with, and from, Shared Norms

An important aim of this Article is to question the common understanding that values are idiosyncratic and non-negotiable. Dis-

agreements which appear to arise from irresolvable conflicts between
different individuals' personal values can often be reframed as disagreements about facts. 126 The deep seated disputes reported as evidence of "culture wars" 12 7 are genuine controversies, but not always,
123.

See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.

124.

See, e.g., SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 18 (moral values lack-

ing analytical and rhetorical foundation); Green, supra note 4, at 21 (personal values are
separate from professional values).
125. This argument is reminiscent of Bruce Green's objection to lawyers using personal values in legal ethics contexts. See Green, supra note 4, at 56-57. The problem with
Green's argument is that he applies it to a much larger class of moral questions, and not
(seemingly) just to the incomparability exceptions, which may be rather scarce. The reliance on legal norms is also the position defended by William Simon. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 138-39; William H. Simon, Moral Pluck, 101 COLUM. L.

Rv.421, 439 (2001).
126. See Waldron, Objectivity of Morals, supra note 78, at 1374 ("In real-life ethical confrontations, people entangle their moral claims with factual propositions about human
nature and the world. They deliberately open up the former to the latter, sometimes holding themselves prepared to abandon or modify a moral position if the facts turn out to be
different.").
127. SeeJAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA
(1991); A. WOLFE, ONE NATION, supra note 12, at 13.
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or even often, about values. The reasons given in defense of positions
on the death penalty, or divorce, or gun control, or gay marriage, or
even abortion tend to assert factual premises, or predictions about future harms or benefits. 128 (Faith-based arguments are also prevalent,
but those arguments are not persuasive as a justification for a moral
position, as we saw earlier. 129 ) The differences of opinion seldom, by
contrast, hinge on definitions about what is "good."
In this Part, I address one attractive possibility for working with
agreement, one that builds upon the classical and traditional moral
theories. I suggest that using theory as a way to work from common
sentiments is problematic at a practical level. I then describe a more
promising method of ethical reasoning, casuistry, 130 which employs
agreement as a starting point and a focus for moral assessment. I end
this Part with a review of sociological work which offers evidence of
the shared norms upon which casuists rely.
A.

Moral Theory and Its Limits

A seemingly promising way to advance conversations about ethics
from the realm of personal opinion and preferences to a more substantive reasoned plane is through the use of moral theory. Imagine
again a common ethical disagreement in a law school or law practice
setting: You defend deceiving your opponent in a negotiation about a
material fact, and I disapprove of your choice. Our disagreement is
rather fruitless if we remain at an ad hominum level, so perhaps we
ought to move to a careful consideration of moral theory. If we apply
the more prominent moral theories to our disagreement, we may
reach some common understanding of the moral principles involved,
and perhaps we may even agree about a resolution to our debate. At a
minimum, moral theory grounds our conversation in a way that our
expressing our strong personal opinions does not.
Many observers make this kind of suggestion. 13 1 Not surprisingly,
the most common advice urges the study of the two historically most
128. This thesis is explored in the context of a review of Alan Wolfe's sociological studies on American values. See infra notes 174-207 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
130. One of the leading casuist writers denies that this process should be seen as a
"methodology," fearing that such a word implies too formal an idea. See Albert R. Jonsen,
Casuistry: An Alternative or Complement to Principles?,5 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 237, 241

(1995) [hereinafter Jonsen, Alternative or Complement].
131. Many standard professional responsibility textbooks introduce moral theory in an
early chapter, implicitly or explicitly in order to aid students to understand better the
moral issues they will confront in the course and in their practices. See, e.g., RHODE, ETHICS
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prominent theories, utilitarianism and deontology, 132 although other
kinds of moral theories, including the conception of virtue ethics, find
their way into texts about professional ethics deliberation.1 3 3 The
more one understands about moral philosophy, the better prepared
one will be to confront "the intractability of moral dilemma: moments
of crisis when, viewed honestly, the paths of right and wrong conduct
do not clearly stretch out from one's feet." 134 Some scholars explicitly

urge greater study by law students of "'metaethics,' or the study of
1 35
value systems."
These moral theory proposals make much good sense, but they
are blemished by some deep problems. I do not pretend to discount
the value of exploring the rich philosophical traditions that underpin
modern moral discourse. Far be it from me to minimize the brilliance
of the elaborate theories of moral reasoning offered by Kant, 136 or the
intricate efforts of the consequentialists to respond to the admittedly
dogmatic elements of Kantian theory. 137 My several concerns run in
the opposite direction, and actually grow out of the sophistication
needed to join these philosophical debates.
My worries are three. First, those who introduce competing moral
theories to young professionals in training do so in order to offer a
choice among several orientations.1 38 The implication is that one "opts
in" at some stage of her professional development and makes moral
choices based on the resulting decisional path. 139 (This suggestion insupra note 76, at 11-32; MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL.,
PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 4-27 (5th ed. 2001).
132. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 131, at 6-17, 20-27. The same advice appears in
BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD,

applied ethics sources in medicine, again not surprisingly. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 50, at 47-62.
133. See RHODE, ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD, supra note 76, at 19; BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 50, at 62-69.
134. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 71 (1986).

135. Timothy P. Terrell, Turmoil at the Normative Core of Lawyering: Uncomfortable Lessons
from the "Metaethics" of Legal Ethics, 49 EMORY L.J. 87, 88 (2000).
136.

SeeJOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 324-25 (2000)

(praise for Kant); Jeremy Waldron, A Life on Their Own, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 599 (2002) (reviewing RAWLS).
137. See, e.g.,John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of RationalBehaviour, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 44-46 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982); j.J.C. Smart,
An Outline of a System of UtilitarianEthics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 26 (J.J.C.
Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973).
138.

See, e.g., RHODE, ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD, supra note 76, at 13, 27-32;

Terrell, supra note 135, at 113 ("distiguish[ing] between two subtle approaches to choosing
one's values").
139. See Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 30, at 501-02 (developing this
argument).
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cludes the accompanying implication that one would make different
choices depending on where one lands. 140 ) There exists a serious question whether law students and lawyers have the skill and sophistication
necessary to understand the theories well enough to make such a
commitment. 141 Kant in his original texts is extraordinarily difficult to
understand, and those who offer to make his teachings clearer are
seldom that much more comprehensible.1 4 2 Perhaps students are expected to make an ad hoc path choice after reading a page or two
summary (or even a chapter or two), but even stating that possibility
1 43

shows its absurdity.

The second worry follows from the first. Even if a lawyer learned a
great deal about the intricacies of the two (or more) competing theories, she still may not want to "opt in" to one camp in exclusion of the
other. Sometimes, she might find the Kantian idea of dignity and autonomy far more attractive than an opposing choice grounded in consequentialist notions of efficiency or best interests. 144 At other times,
she might find herself relying on the utilitarian idea of using scarce
resources efficiently, even if doing so fails to afford sufficient respect
140. See, e.g., SAMUEL GOROWITZ ET AL., MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 543 (1976)
(describing a medical school examination with the following instructions: "Describe a medical situation in which different decisions might be made by a Kantian (or Rawlsian) on the
one hand and a utilitarian on the other. Explain what the difference would be and how it
would arise."); RHODE, ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD, supra note 76, at 25-27.
141. While his Holmes Lectures arguments may be quite flawed in many respects,
Judge Posner's assertion there about the inaccessibility of modern philosophical literature
is hard to quarrel with. See Posner, Problematics,supra note 7, at 1670-71. At least one of his
critical commentators agrees with him on that score. See Nussbaum, supra note 7, at
1794-95.
142. An anecdote: I recently read John Rawls's Harvard University undergraduate lectures on the history of moral philosophy, most of which covers Kant's writings. See RAwLs,
supra note 136. At the risk of exposing my intellectual frailties (which, I suppose, have been
readily apparent to readers thus far), I found this careful exposition of Kant's ideas still
extremely difficult to assimilate and to understand in any comprehensive way. Even if I
were to follow the very exquisite and careful logic of Kant, I confess that I would have some
trouble relying on that analysis to guide my decisions in the hurly-burly of my law practice
(or, for that matter, my everyday life).
One notable exception to my criticism of modern writers about Kant would be Simon
Blackburn's short work on moral philosophy, but that book offers the briefest and most
cursory coverage of the body of Kantian thinking. See BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 116-24.
143. SeeJohn Arras, Principles and Particularity:The Role of Cases in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.J.
983, 989 (1994) [hereinafter Principlesand Particularity](criticizing this "menu" conception
as a "Consumer Reports" model of applied ethics).
144. Bradley Wendel reminds us of Derrick Bell's Space Traders story as a powerful
argument against the pleasure maximization principle that one might understand to follow
from consequentialist reasoning. See Wendel, Value Pluralism, supra note 34, at 213 (quoting DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERSISTENCE OF RACISM 158
(1992)).
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to individual plights. 145 She rightfully objects to any efforts to induce a
commitment on her part to a defined moral theory.
The third worry then follows directly from the first two. The reason why the lawyer resists commitment to a theory which could then
determine her future actions is that her moral choices are not made
in a deductive fashion, by applying a theory to a set of facts and deducing the right response from that syllogistic reasoning. The explanation why the lawyer might find a deontological approach attractive in
one setting and a utilitarian approach attractive in another is that the
context determines her sentiments, and not a theory.1 46 Moral theories, and the mid-level principles that applied ethicists craft from the
grander theories,1 47 reflect and organize sentiments drawn from work
with actual cases. As many commentators have noted, when a carefully
crafted theory clashes with deeply held moral sentiments, the theory
148
gets jettisoned, not the sentiments.
Assignment of classic philosophical treatises, then, can have considerable worth as they inform conversations about moral value, but
not the worth that its proponents imply. Besides its inaccurate assumption of deductive reasoning among deliberators, the theory conception fails to offer a method of assigning priorities or of ranking when

145. I might use my own work as an example of this kind of "switch hitting." I have
defended a fairly consequentialist approach to triage decisions within legal services practice. See Paul R. Tremblay, "Acting a Very Moral Type of God": Triage and Poor Clients, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 2475 (1999). Elsewhere, I have defended a decidedly Kantian conception
of individual autonomy and dignity in commenting on the proper role for lawyers working
with possibly disabled clients. See Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism:Lawyer
Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 515. Maybe I'm
wrong on one of these stances, but it seems unlikely that I'm wrong because I have incorporated strands of different moral theory in my analyses.
146. See, e.g.,JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL 40 (1988); Annette Baier, Doing Without Moral Theory, in POSTURES OF THE MIND 228, 230 (Annette Baier ed., 1985).
147. See BEAUcHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 50, at 15 (describing a process of reasoning from theories to principles to action). The role of principles in applied moral decisionmaking remains very controversial, particularly among bioethicists. For a very recent
iteration of the debate, see Henry S. Richardson, Specifying, Balancing, and Interpreting
BioethicalPrinciples,25J. MED. & PHIL. 285 (2000); Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver and K
Danner Clouser, Common Morality Versus Specified Principlism:Reply to Richardson, 25 J. MED.
& PHIL. 308 (2000). For earlier contributions to this conversation, see RONALD P. HAMEL ET
AL., BEYOND PRINCIPLISM (1993); A MATrER OF PRINCIPLES?: FERMENT IN U.S. BIOETHICS (Edwin R. DuBose ed., 1995); Ezekial J. Emanuel, The Beginning of the End of Principlism,25 THE
HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 37, 38 (July-Aug. 1995).
148. This is the lesson of Derrick Bell's story about the Space Traders. See BELL, supra
note 144, at 158. The observation in the text may be found in Principlesand Particularity,
supra note 143, at 988-91.
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theories or principles conflict. 149 The next Part addresses a technique
of moral deliberation that builds upon this quality of moral theory
and ethical principles.
B.

Casuistry As a Deliberative Technique

As I have described at some length elsewhere, 15 0 the art of casuistry has garnered considerable attention among ethicists in recent
years, particularly within bioethics. 1 5 1 Casuistry offers a method of
moral reasoning and deliberation which resists theorizing and which
builds upon common sentiments about normative value. "Unlike
Kantianism, utilitarianism, coherentism, and contractarianism, [casuistry] does not claim to be an ethical theory.' 1 52 Casuistry's elements
have been described cogently by the ethicist Carson Strong:
[Casuistry] is a case-based approach in which an argument is developed by comparing the case at hand with paradigmcases in which it
is reasonably clear what course of action should be taken. In addition, the comparisons of cases are made in terms of certain morally
relevant factors, which I refer to as "casuistic factors" and which
can vary from case to case. The decision which is best will depend
on the extent to which these factors are present in the given case.
Moreover, casuistry does not generally claim to reach certainty in
its conclusions. The strength of the conclusions depends on the
plausibility of the comparison with the paradigm cases.... Furthermore, casuistry does not claim to be able to resolve all cases. When
disagreements ... cannot be resolved, it might sometimes be appropriate to conclude that several alternative courses of action are
permissible . . . . 153
54
The paradigm cases represent the source of shared sentiments.
Most ethical dilemmas or quandaries consist of stories or circumstances where multiple, competing ethical principles or moral theories seem to apply, and how to rank or prioritize the conflicting norms
is not readily apparent. In some of those stories or circumstances, the
dilemma or conflict will be insoluble, for incomparability reasons described by Bradley Wendel. 155 In those cases, despite the angst experienced by the agent who must proceed amidst the uncertainty, there is
149. See Carson Strong, Specified Principlism: Wat It Is, and Does it Really Resolve Cases
Better than Casuistry?, 25J. MED. & PHIL. 323, 323 (2000).
150. See Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 30.
151. The revival of casuistry has been attributed to the pathbreaking book by Stephen
Toulmin and Albert Jonsen. SeeJONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 8.
152. Strong, supra note 149, at 330.
153. Id. at 331.
154. See Braunack-Mayer, supra note 10, at 73; KuczEwsKJ, supra note 10, at 72.
155. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
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no available right answer and her actions cannot be criticized. Of
course, not all dilemmas or conflicts are so insoluble-if they were,
ethical conversation would have no purpose. Ethical conversation and
debate assumes that some issues are subject to reasoned analysis. Casuistry offers a coherent, practical method for that analysis. It permits
the same kind of inductive, analogy-driven scrutiny that legal scholars
employ when using common law precedent to decide on a right answer in a difficult legal dispute.1 56 Law students perform that process
regularly in substantive law courses; they might then be shown a similar process in ethics contexts.
Casuistry, thus described, invites reasoned, principled argument
about ethics questions in a fashion which evades reliance upon personal opinions. It also allows, but does not require, sustained study of
classic moral theories, and it need not ask participants to opt in as an
adherent of one theorist's conception over another's. It works from
the ground up, and in that way is anti-theoretical. Different cases will
call for different answers and different analysis. The details of the
cases will be critically important, and, in classrooms unconnected to
1 57
It will
practice, "thick" descriptions will fare better than "thin."'

leave matters at sea when the incomparability thesis applies, but those
instances will be rather rare.
Casuistry offers comfort and workability, of course, only if shared
sentiments do predominate, or at least exist in some not-insubstantial
way. Without agreement about paradigm cases, casuistry is no method
at all. The remainder of this Part and the next Part develop further
support for the thesis of shared, and non-idiosyncratic, value systems.
Consider the following example where casuistry might refute a
suggestion that value choices are idiosyncratic and personal, and that
156. More accurately, it is the process employed by judges who must determine, expressly and publicly, a right and final answer to a disputed legal claim. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 121-35 (1996) (describing how judges
perform their duties as a form of casuistry); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106
HARv. L. REv. 741 (1995) (noting this quality of analogical reasoning in law and in pragmatic thought).
Practicing lawyers do not have to decide what the "right" decision might be in a case,
for their role is to make the best argument possible for their side. Their duties, though,
include analogizing from precedent, both in crafting persuasive arguments (which will imply the right answer) and in determining the limits of their advocacy, that is, when their
client's position cannot be defended in the face of contrary authority and precedent. See
Stephen Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Ethics andJurisprudence
of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995).
157. See WALZER, supra note 85, at 1-19 (defending a thick perspective when confronting moral questions); Tremblay, The New Casuistry, supra note 30, at 521.
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their conflicts are incomparable. In his brilliant exposition about the
professionalism "crusade," Rob Atkinson describes three archetypes of
lawyering stances, each of which has ethical support for its moral vision. 158 His Type 1 is the "hired gun," or the "Rambo" litigator-an
aggressive, no holds barred advocate with zeal in his heart. 59 Type 2 is
the purposivist lawyer, the counselor who will respect the interests of
third parties and attend to the underlying purposes of procedural
and/or substantive law, rather than exploit the law or procedure instrumentally. 160 Type 3 represents the "cause" lawyer, as aggressive as
the Type 1 lawyer but only for worthy clients (in contrast to Type 1,
who will sell his services to the highest bidder)161
Atkinson offers an environmental litigation example to show how
each of these lawyers would act differently in his or her representation
of a client, but (and this is his prime point) "conscientious people"
162
will disagree on principled grounds about the ethics of each one.
63
Stressing what he terms the "fallacy of the one true way,"' Atkinson
argues that many versions of good practice may coexist, and the critics
have no right to treat as wrong any one of the versions. Such criticism
implies dogmatism and intolerance of each lawyer's personal
ethics. 164
158. See Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 303-12.
159. Id. at 304-08. The hired gun lawyer has many defenders within the legal ethics
world, including Charles Fried, Ted Schneyer, and Stephen Pepper. See Fried, supra note
95; Schneyer, Hired Gun, supra note 99; Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A
Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 613 [hereinafter Pepper,
Amoral Role].
160. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 308-10. The Type 2 lawyer looks
to David Luban and William Simon for her ethical support. See LUBAN, LAwYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 128-47; SIMON, THE PRACrIcE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 138-69.

161. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 3. Atkinson's evidence of ethical
support for this Type is a bit more scant, but he includes himself, see Rob Atkinson, Beyond
the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REv. 853 (1992), as one such defender. For a
thorough exploration of the "cause lawyering" practice, see CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,

1998).
162. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 305.
163. Id. at 303.
164. In his defense of the liberal neutrality thesis, Atkinson argues himself into a corner, it seems. His neutrality position appears clearest when he comments about the role of
law professors teaching students. He writes,
[P] rofessors should, in fidelity to the tradition of liberal education, eschew insisting that the values of the current professionalism crusade or any particularvision of
how to be a good person or a good lawyer is right or true, beyond dissection and critical

examination. Conversely, they should insist that no conscientiously presented vision

of lawyering,

tempt ....

or,

for

that

matter,

of

law

itself,

is

beneath

con-

Without pronouncing what right and good ultimately are, [some] scholars
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One might read the Atkinson taxonomy and conclude that here
we have a vivid example of what we identified above as "incomparability."1 65 Good moral arguments abound in this debate, and without any
covering values each lawyer is left to her or his own sensibility, character, and life story to choose her appropriate legal identity.
The casuist is not satisfied, though. First, what could it mean to
say that "conscientious people" might disagree about the propriety of
the three advocacy types? Atkinson argues that the fact of this conscientious disagreement precludes teachers and bar leaders from taking
sides. 16 6 That conclusion simply doesn't follow from its premise. The
debates between, say, Luban 1 67 and Simon 168 on the one hand and
Pepper169 and Schneyer1

70

on the other might be insoluble, but we

needn't automatically assume so. Atkinson implies that once some
writers support a version of lawyering with reasoned arguments the
debate is over. He rejects the possibility that those arguments might
be flawed. To the extent that the debates about moral activism rest on
historical analysis, factual assumptions, predictions about future behaviors, sociological data, and strands of logical reasoning, they can
be assessed and evaluated for coherence and persuasiveness. Law
professors assign B minus grades to students who perform legal analysis but get the answers wrong. They do not assume that the students'
having presented an argument precludes the professors from judging
its cogency. So it ought to be with flawed moral arguments. 171 On the
other hand, if the moral activism debate ends with true incomparability, because there are no covering values that permit the comparison
to proceed, then Atkinson's proposal is defensible. That conclusion is
have raised fundamental questions about discovering truth and protecting individual autonomy-that purport to be its raison d'etre.
Atkinson, Dissenter'sCommentary, supra note 4, at 338 (emphasis added). It is puzzling, to say
the least, to imagine how one might analyze, criticize, and "raise fundamental questions
about" lawyering practices without some underlying premises about what might be right or
good. Further, Atkinson implies that if such analysis and assessment demonstrate that
some behaviors are wrong, the commitment to liberal ideology will prevent a professor
from recognizing that fact, or from testing her students on their reasoning to arrive at that
fact. Unless he is proposing a starkly subjectivist attitude toward moral beliefs, Atkinson's
proposals here present insurmountable obstacles to good faith teachers.
165. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text. See also Wendel, Value Pluralism,
supra note 34, at 141.
166. See id. at 338.
167. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 48.
168. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47.
169. See Pepper, Amoral Role, supra note 159.
170. See Schneyer, Hired Gun, supra note 99.
171. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing Bruce Green's judge
with idiosyncratic personal values).
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a last resort, though, and not one to be drawn merely because the
participants disagree.
The casuist has a second objection to the neutrality thesis,
though, which is stronger, and with which Atkinson might agree. Let
us assume, for the moment, that the debate about the moral justification of the various lawyering types is an insoluble one. Perhaps there
are no covering values, or perhaps (a more likely scenario) there is no
way to resolve the factual, sociological, and political disputes that underpin the debate. We agree for now that we cannot conclude, ex ante,
that acting as a Type 1 Rambo lawyer (the one we would most often
criticize) is wrong. That concession does not disallow criticisms of
Type 1 lawyering in a particularcontext. This is the deep casuistry suggestion. Some Type 1 lawyering might be bad in some concrete circumstances, and a careful assessment of the facts of the case where the
Type 1 lawyering occurs can permit that kind of moral judgment.
As I noted, Atkinson seems to agree on this point. He refines his
worry about the "one true way" approach of the professionalism crusade by noting that a professional ideal that condemns incivility and
aggressiveness across the board fails to accommodate those cases
where justice requires tricks, rudeness, and aggression. 172 One might
read his "fallacy of the one true way" complaint as casuistic-any hard
and fast visions of a lawyer's role is problematic because it does not
allow for individual context and circumstance. 173 If that is his thesis,
we are in substantial agreement.
C.

Sociological Evidence of Shared Norms

In this Part, I review recent empirical research on the divisions
among middle class Americans on questions of value. The casuistry
thesis presupposes many common and shared sentiments, represented in that methodology by paradigm cases. If most of us disagree
about basic, fundamental values, as is frequently asserted, then not
only is the casuist's project in some jeopardy, but also at risk is any
effort to find reasoned grounding for conversations about ethics
generally.
The empirical work I review shows significant disagreement
among Americans about morally-relevant topics, but not always, inter172. Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 319. As he writes, "we are reminded of a classic . . . formula for civility: never hurt another person's feelings-without
meaning to. And, most of us would add, except for a good cause." Id. (citation omitted).
173. This reading of Atkinson does clash with his insistence of liberal neutrality in
teaching about good lawyering. See supra note 164.
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estingly, at the level of value. The disagreements that surface far more
often than not reflect different and conflicting perceptions about the
world's operations, about human psychology and dynamics, and about
factual propositions. People tend to agree about what they hold dear
and important, and what constitutes bad acts or bad results. They argue instead about what causes or will encourage the good, and what
might minimize the bad.
The work that I review is that of Alan Wolfe, the prominent sociologist and civic republican commentator who has surveyed middle
74
class Americans about their moral, political, and religious beliefs.'
His research consisted of elaborate surveys inquiring into beliefs,
value preferences, and attitudes, and extensive follow-up interviews
with carefully selected respondents, in order to understand more
deeply and accurately the nature of their moral commitments. He dist 75
sected the results of his work in two separate books.
Wolfe's studies demonstrate broad agreement among typical
Americans about the obligation to act in morally defensible ways, as
well as about the bases by which actions might be defended and justified. While his work shows substantial consensus about what "counts,"
it shows at the same time significant disparity in how his respondents
balance conflicting commitments. Wolfe might beg to differ with the
assertion that his respondents evince much consensus about right and
wrong (his commentary is rather inconsistent on this score 176), but a
careful reading of their reports and narratives shows very little disagreement about the commitments that ought to matter. Their disagreements in practice, in the application of the shared norms to
individual circumstances, show them to be practicing casuists. 177 In a
rather unpersuasive argument, Wolfe criticizes repeatedly ordinary
Americans' practice of justifying individual choices by complex bal174. See A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12; A. WOLFE, ONE NATION, supra note
12.
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 168 (the respondents have
"roughly the same views" about "fundamental questions about human nature, the formation of character, qualities of good and evil, and the sources of moral authority") compared with id. at 199 ("[t]he respondents .. .take for granted something revolutionary:
never have so many people been so free of moral restraint as contemporary Americans").
177. I noted in my earlier work on casuistry the similar observation by the ethicistJohn
Arras: "it turns out that, like the bourgeois gentilhomme, we've all been 'practicing casuistry' all along .... John D. Arras, Common Law Morality, 20 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 35 (July/
Aug. 1990), referring to MOLIf RE, THE WOULD-BE GENTLEMAN (1670). See Tremblay, The
New Casuistry, supra note 30, at 526.
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ancing of conflicting duties in a contextual, situational manner.1 78 I
179
address that argument at the end of this Part.
Wolfe's report on the first set of investigations 180 described his
200 respondents' opinions about a number of the hot button "culture
war" topics, including immigration, treatment of gays and lesbians, affirmative action, patriotism, welfare, and religion. He concludes, "on
moral matters, there is no unanimity in America," 8 1 but notes at the
same time that his research has "found little support for the notion
that middle-class Americans are engaged in bitter cultural conflict
over the proper way to live." 18 2 Even as they argue about and disagree
about each of the topics he explores, his respondents evidence broad
agreement about what counts as good, but deep uncertainty about
1 83
whether certain policies or programs contribute to that goodness.
The respondents persistently reflect conflict between competing values, and uncertainty about how to resolve those conflicts.
Wolfe follows his Middle Class Morality Project report with further empirical study. In 2000 Wolfe conducted, in cooperation with
The New York Times, a public opinion poll which asked Americans
about "their views on sex, money, morality, work, children, identity,
and God."'

84

Like with his earlier project, Wolfe followed the poll with

in-depth interviews of 205 respondents from eight carefully chosen
communities. 185 In reporting the results of the more recent survey
and interviews, Wolfe developed a hypothesis he labels the "moral
freedom" claim. His theory interests us here.
A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 202 (referring to moral
178. See, e.g.,
freedom as a "do-as-you-please affair").
179. See infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
180. See Wolfe, One Nation, supra note 12. Wolfe, supported by the Russell Sage Foundation, conducted what he called the Middle Class Morality Project, consisting of interviews with and a survey of 200 middle-class persons living in eight carefully chosen
suburban communities. See id. at 18-31.
181.
182.

Id. at 276.
Id. at 278.

183. For instance, Wolfe's respondents express some remarkably dated opinions about
whether mothers should work, but those who are worried about that behavior express their
worries by reference to harm to children. See id. at 94-111. On questions of welfare and
immigration, the middle-class Americans express a variety of opinions, but the disagreements rest on perceptions about the worthiness of the individuals who seek to immigrate
or who apply for welfare. Those worthiness judgments, in turn, reflect factual assumptions
(deeply held ones, we might presume) about why the individuals are in the position they
find themselves in. See id. at 134-63 (immigration); 195-209 (welfare).
184.
185.

A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 3.
See id. at 4-5.
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Wolfe's thesis is that Americans have lost connection with, and
lost an unyielding adherence to, core, unquestioned traditional values, including "[w]ork, thrift, temperance, fidelity, self-reliance, selfdiscipline, cleanliness, [and] godliness... ,"186 He calls the practice of
choosing one's values and making moral judgment calls on a case by
case basis "moral freedom," and he considers acceptance of that kind
of reasoning a dangerous and troubling one. 187 The claim of lost virtue is, of course, a common one. 188 If that claim is true, Wolfe's respondents seem not to suffer from this amoral (or immoral) bent, if
their conversations with Wolfe and his researchers are to be credited.
None of Wolfe's respondents defends a personal morality which holds
that work, or self-reliance, or self-discipline, or fidelity, or thrift, and
so on, is not something to be valued. That would be an unusual and
pretty unpersuasive position to adopt. 18 9
What Wolfe does observe, however, is a resistance to an unwavering commitment to any one virtue; like those in his earlier study, his
respondents continually weigh certain core values against others as
they search for meaning and coherence in their lives. Wolfe describes
this casuistry in unflattering terms usually,1 9 0 but it is readily apparent
that the citizens with whom he spoke care a great deal about doing
what is right. A brief review of two virtues he examines will make this
point clear.

186.
187.
188.

Id. at 66, quoting GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, Two CULTURES 5 (1999).
See id. at 198-232.
Wolfe cites, among other authorities, WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE BOOK OF VIRTUES:

A TREASURY OF GREAT MORAL STORIES (1993), and ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE

(1987).
189. There is evidence of some respondents rejecting the "godliness" virtue, but it is
hard to imagine that Wolfe could seriously be troubled by the occasional incidence of
atheism within American culture. See A. WOLFE, ONE NATION, supra note 12, at 39-87.
AMERICAN MIND

190.

See, e.g., A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 223 (stating:

Listening to the way our respondents talk gives a certain amount of credence to
those who argue that contemporary Americans have too much freedom for their
own good. When they decide whether to tell or shade the truth, to stay with their
job or family or leave, to discipline their instincts for the sake of long term reward, and to forgive but not forget, our respondents are guided by subjective
feelings more than they are by appeals to rational, intellectual, and objective conceptions of right and wrong. It is not standards of excellence to which they turn,
but what seems best capable of avoiding hurt to others .... Without firm moral
instruction, Americans approach the virtues gingerly. They recognize their importance, but since they are wary of treating moral principles as absolute, they
reinvent their meaning to make sense of the situations in which they find
themselves.)
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One of the virtues which critics, including Wolfe, see as lost today
is that of honesty. 19 1 In older, and better, times, it seems, people told
the truth most of the time; nowadays people fib or lie and don't see it
as a problem when they do so. Recalling the Kantian position that all
lies violate the categorical imperative, 19 2 Wolfe worries that "Americans think about honesty as a conditional, not absolute, value ....
This is a way of thinking that, because it encourages relativism, would
not sit well with classical theories of the virtues, but it is widespread
nonetheless. 1 93 There may or may not be less honesty than in past
eras, but people recognize honesty as an important virtue. Among
Wolfe's respondents, no other virtue "was brought up as spontaneously, and as frequently, as honesty."1 94 The citizens interviewed believed that honesty was an obligation presumptively, but not
invariably. Story after story from the respondents evidenced a commitment to truthfulness unless some overriding harm or trumping consideration made honesty unwise. 195 That position is hardly an immoral
one; indeed, Kant's dogmatic opinion to the contrary, the negotiability of honesty is among the most widely held moral positions among
ethicists today. 196
Wolfe's claim that "[n]either St. Augustine nor Immanuel Kant
would find much to admire in the way modem Americans think about
honesty [because] [w] hether they live in local communities or big cities, Americans do not believe that telling the truth constitutes a moral
command they ought always to obey" 19 7 is a hollow and unfair criticism. That description shows not that the people he met had impoverished values, but rather, one might argue, that their values were
enriched, for they recognized, or tried to recognize, when adherence
to an absolute standard would cause greater moral harm than deviating from it. It may be that the respondents have made those casuistic
choices poorly, but Wolfe's stories do not show that to be the case. a9 8
And even if it were the case that the citizens were unskilled casuists,
191. See id. at 97-130.
192. See id. at 97 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns, in GROUNDINGS FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 65 (1981 ed.)).
193. Id. at 125.
194. Id. at 101.
195. See id. at 102-09.
196. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIE (1989);

Weflaufer, supra note 29, at 1230-32; Loder, supra note 29, at 46-48.
197. A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 109.
198. There is some evidence that the moral choices about honesty made by the respondents were perhaps a bit difficult to square with a principled casuistry. For instance, one
person, after claiming that "I consider myself to be really honest," volunteered that "I will
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and made the wrong call often, that fact does not render them lacking
in a commitment to values. As they repeatedly told the researchers,
they believed in honesty unless being honest caused some greater
harm.
Wolfe's reports and commentary about the virtue of loyalty reflect a similar pattern. "Of all the virtues presumed to have been lost
in America, loyalty generally takes pride of place," he writes. 199 Critics
of the declining moral state of contemporary America lament the rise
of self-interested, individualistic thinking and the accompanying decline in commitment to family, employer, and local community. 200
One might conclude from such reports that ordinary people hold differing views about the value of loyalty, with some holding it dear and
others not considering it to be an important norm.
Wolfe's interviews belie that conclusion. It may well be, as Wolfe
insists, that his respondents are less loyal than traditional Americans
used to be, in the sense that they tend to divorce more often, change
employers with more frequency, and relocate communities with less
apparent regret than previous generations. Their actions, though, do
not represent a betrayal of loyalty or a rejection of that virtue. Instead,
his respondents repeatedly report a commitment to loyalty and a respect for it as a value. 20 1 The difficulty for most people is balancing
the loyalty commitment with other, conflicting commitments. Loyalty
is an accepted and valued character trait, but it is not a trump, particularly when adherence to that value causes considerable harm or betrayal of other commitments.
The best example of the moral casuistry evidenced by Wolfe's stories is that of divorce. Wolfe quotes conservative commentators who
interpret rising divorce rates as unambiguous proof of the loss of loyalty as a real virtue in contemporary American culture. 20 2 The stories
he relates, however, show a significantly more complicated phenomenon. Americans demonstrate a very strong commitment to marriage
and to the loyalty promise that the marriage vows represent. 20 3 They
cheat the IRS if I have a chance. And insurance companies, I would cheat them too." Id. at

108.
199.
200.

Id. at 23.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITE AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 5-6 (1995).
201. See, e.g., A. WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 29, 34, 35, 52, 53 (quoting or
paraphrasing respondents who value loyalty and struggle to balance differing loyalties).

202.

See id. at 45 (quoting BARBARA

DEFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE

(1997)).

203. See id. at 49-50 ("Many of those with whom we talked made it clear that they were
anything but frivolous in the way they thought about divorce ....
Americans think hard
about the conditions under which divorce is or is not justified.").
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are unwilling, however, to accept the virtue of loyalty as blanketjustification for perpetuating abuse, harm to children, or deep unhappiness
of the marriage partners. 20 4 No participant in the Wolfe study rejected
loyalty as a good or viewed marriage as a trifle which one might ignore
if something more interesting happened by. Perhaps some in America
subscribe to that view, but few of us have met them, and fewer would
take them seriously if we did. Instead, the respondents struggle hard
and deeply as they balance the agreed-upon value of loyalty with the
similarly-shared goals of avoiding harm, escaping physical and emotional abuse, raising well-adjusted children, and leading more productive lives. 20 5 Perhaps the critics charging that loyalty ought to serve
essentially as a trump would argue that these latter goals should be
sacrificed in the interests of the virtue of loyalty. It's not hard to conclude that such an argument would be, at a minimum, unsettling.
If Wolfe's respondents are to be taken seriously-and they certainly sound familiar to us in their stories and in their struggles with
moral conflict-the critics who charge that Americans have lost their
commitment to loyalty, and that the loss is an altogether regretful
thing, are mistaken. The argument that Americans have idiosyncratic
value systems and personal preferences that have little in common
with one another simply does not find support in Wolfe's stories and
surveys. What might be true, however (and this may be a better interpretation of the critics' lament), is that the respondents are making
poor choices in their casuistry, in their balancing of the several values
which they share. Barbara Defoe Whitehead may be arguing that
those who divorce today are overestimating the benefits of divorce
and underestimating its harms. 20 6 That contest, though, is not one
about values. It is instead about facts, supported by research and investigation into plausibly empirical data. It may not be easily resolved,
but it lends itself to some conceivable resolution separate from the
debate about a ranking or trumping of virtues. It is the kind of inquiry
20 7
that casuistry contemplates.
204. See id. at 52 ("Remaining in an abusive marriage can be taken as an expression of
loyalty, but it can also be viewed as a violation of the principle never to condone cruelty.").
205. See, e.g., id. at 60 ("The decline of a conception of loyalty in which people pledge
to remain together until death do them part can be keenly felt, but it is not clear whether it
can or should survive the onset of new ways in which loyalty is redefined to accommodate
itself to how we actually live.") (emphasis added).
206. I suspect that she would indeed make those arguments. See WHITEHEAD, supra note
202, at 7-8.
207. See Albert R. Jonsen, Strong on Specification, 25 J. MED. & PHIL. 348, 350 (2000)
(stressing importance of the "set of particulars" in the working of casuistry).
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I end this exploration of Alan Wolfe's investigation into American values with some brief comments on his critique of "moral freedom," for his criticisms bear directly on the struggles in professional
schools surrounding teaching about professional and personal values.
Wolfe's ultimate thesis in his most recent book is that moral freedom
is a tragic thing.20 8 Moral freedom, in his eyes, permits Americans to
decide for themselves what is right, and that permission invites dangerous self-interested choices. The result of the emergence of moral
freedom is worrisome moral decline, because the traditional virtues of
honesty, integrity, self-discipline, loyalty, and hard work are no longer
accorded the almost non-negotiable respect that they used to receive,
before moral freedom arrived. 20 9 As Wolfe writes:
Moral freedom means that individuals should determine for themselves what it means to lead a good and virtuous life. Contemporary
Americans find answers to the perennial questions asked by theologians and moral philosophers, not by conforming to strictures
handed down by God or nature, but by considering who they are,
what others require, and what consequences follow from acting
one way rather than another.
[N]ever have so many people been so free of moral constraint as
contemporary Americans .... For if there are no binding moral
rules-if individuals are as free to drop or add their moral beliefs
with the same alacrity with which they buy or sell stocks-then all
social relationships,
including those of free exchange, will be
210
threatened.

It is difficult to understand Wolfe's point here. Perhaps he offers
a lament, a longing, or a dirge: "In earlier times, people did not think
about right or wrong. Instead, they obeyed higher powers and
respected higher principles reflexively. They respected the virtues,
and life was better as a result."211 If that is his point, we can hear him,
even if we may disagree about either the description about whether
people were so reflexive or whether the result of the blind adherence
was altogether a good thing. But his point seems also a prescriptive
one, a call to return to those better days. As such, it is essentially
tautological.
208. A.
209.

WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM,

supra note 12, at 198-231.

See id. at 199.

210. Id. at 195, 199, 201. This argument has been made by another virtue adherent in
her description of modern judges. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS:
HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 152 (1994)
(modern liberal judges are free "from the constraints of statute, precedent, Constitution,
or tradition").
211. The quote is mine. Wolfe seems to be describing the halcyon classical times in
America. See, e.g., id. at 209-11.
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Wolfe cannot plausibly urge Americans to become unthinking
again, to reject reasoning about right and wrong in favor of blind,
non-cognitive 21 2 acceptance of traditional virtues. He apparently fails
to appreciate that he himself exercises his "moral freedom" when he
develops, in the year 2001, reasoned arguments in favor of returning
to earlier times when none of us thought about what might be a better
way to live, or believed we had the right to think about it. He undoubtedly concludes that moral and civic life would be better if we adhered
to higher authorities without our deciding for ourselves how to answer
questions about moral value. He might be right about that conclusion
(although there is good reason to doubt him), but by the very submission of his argument he refutes it, for he is choosing, and not blindly
and not in a non-cognitive fashion, a better way to live a moral life. In
doing so, he is exercising his moral freedom.
Aside from its tautological essence, Wolfe's argument confuses
moral freedom with moral irresponsibility, and reflects a deep worry
about the latter despite very little, if any, evidence of it from his
surveys and interviews. He worries that "in the absence of binding
moral rules, what prevents me from deciding, after you had given me
possession of the car I agreed to buy from you, that I ought to keep
my money after all?" 2 13 This question disrespects, in a profound way,

his respondents and misunderstands their commitment to shared
norms and to collective values. It is from his surveys and interviews
that he seems to have discerned the pattern of moral freedom, yet not
one of his respondents has asserted that stealing a car is a good thing,
or expressed any similar opinion from which Wolfe could draw such
an inference. They may well reject a universally binding rule condemning stealing in every instance, so that a husband might be justi214
fied to steal drugs from a pharmacist to save his dying wife.
However, in doing so they will not conclude, as Wolfe implies, that
because no binding rule exists, any stealing that helps them at the
moment is morally acceptable. Indeed, Wolfe himself seemingly cannot identify any such binding rules which he would defend as non2 15
negotiable.
212. Wolfe explicitly suggests that the antidote to moral freedom is non-cognitive
moral assessment. "Our capacity to act rationally is dependent upon a morality that evolves
outside our cognitive control." Id. at 201.
213. Id.
214. I borrow this story from Carol Gilligan's work. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 25-32 (1983).
215. Wolfe is obviously deeply suspicious of allowing ordinary persons to make their
own moral choices, but in each moral topic he explores, Wolfe reports sympathetically that
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This review of Wolfe's work offers insights into the virtues of casuistry. Wolfe's rich and detailed stories and reports show that plain persons accept, by and large, the basic elements of a good and virtuous
life, including the supposed "lost" virtues. Plain people do disagree,
though, at the level of application, and the product of that disagreement might initially appear as a dangerous form of relativism or lack
of "moral backbone." 2 16 The temptation in response to such disagreement may be to call for a commitment to firmer principles or stricter
rules, but that proposal is doomed, for no body of rules or principles
or virtues can avoid the call for individual choice when the rules or
virtues or principles conflict. Wolfe's respondents demonstrate a persistent casuistry, but we cannot tell from his reports whether it is a very
good or skillful casuistry. These plain persons may be making self-interested choices rather than well-reasoned ones, as Wolfe implies. The
remedy for that problem, assuming of course that they wish to arrive
at more defensible or better decisions, is to teach the skill of casuistry
more widely. This same lesson will apply, of course, to lawyers and law
students.
IV.

What About the Felons, the Whores, and the Jerks?

The previous two Parts explored moral deliberation ideas, and
assumed for the sake of discussion that the lawyers and law students in
question desired to be better moral deliberators. In this Part we meet
up with the rest of the profession. What about those lawyers who, from
all indications, just don't care about doing what's right? Do we have
anything to say about them?
Whether we have anything to say about, or to, them depends on
who these folks are, and, indeed, whether they exist at all. Consider
four possibilities:
1. Maybe They Don't Exist at All

It is at least conceivable that what we observers witness as evidence of unscrupulous behavior by unscrupulous lawyers is, in
fact, good faith moral choice amidst complex circumstances,
which we critics cannot understand or evaluate from our distant
perspective. Admittedly, it is unlikely that all of the seemingly
bad behavior within the profession is explainable in this fash-

ion, but the arguments developed here, and the arguments of
most ethicists describing the nature of moral inquiry, suggest
sometimes circumstances exist where one might, for good reason, choose not to adhere to
that virtue. See id. at 99 (honesty), 51 (loyalty), 163 (forgiveness).
216.

Id. at 91.
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that our ability to evaluate moral choice from a distance is a frail
one. 2 17 By this assumption, the behaviors suspected to be antisocial and/or criminal are in fact correct and justified. The mistake is ours, not the lawyers'.
2. Maybe They're Felons, Wores, and Jerks, and That's the End of the
Story
The next possibility is the one that many assume to be the case:
Some lawyers are simply without moral fiber, will cheat and lie
and steal for their own personal gain, and (most important for
this categorization) don't care to act any differently. While we
have all met some lawyers who we suspect fit this bill, our general sense is that this sociopath description is quite rare. For
present purposes, we can assume that if such persons exist, it is
unlikely that our teaching, example, or professing will make a
whit of difference. Maybe therapy or drugs or jail time will improve these lawyers'
behavior, but that's for another commenta2 18
tor to explore.
3. Maybe They Do Bad Things but They Tried to Get It Right
This possibility is different from the first two. By this assumption, the lawyers we observe and worry about look like felons,
whores, and jerks, but did not intend to end up there. Unlike
the second category, these lawyers want to get it right. Unlike
the first category, they didn't-so here, the critics are right. For
these lawyers, perhaps, teaching about ethical deliberation
might make a difference. For them, all we have explored in the
previous two Parts will apply.
4. Maybe They're Overwhelmed and Out of Control
We now reach an entirely different set of assumptions about
who these bad lawyers might be, or why they look like bad lawyers to us. In this category, the lawyers do bad things; no arguments there. They know their actions are bad, so their
reasoning isn't flawed or unsophisticated, but they care and
worry about having done the bad stuff. And finally, they did the
bad stuff because of powerful pressures and fears over which
they, at that moment, experienced little (or, at least, insufficient) ability to control. These are our most interesting bad lawyers and, I suspect, the most common ones.
It is hard to know with much certainty which of the above explanations accounts for the bad behavior of the felons, the whores, and
the jerks, but one might make some educated guesses. For much of
the unscrupulous or criminal conduct the critics worry about, it seems
reasonably unlikely that the lawyers in question just deliberated in217.

See Wendel, Value Pluralism, supra note 34, at 195.

218.

See supra note 68 and accompanying text (reporting the comments ofJohn Dean).
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eptly, thinking they were doing right but guessing wrong. It also seems
equally implausible that the bad lawyers were simply sociopaths, without any shred of a conscience. I've met few lawyers who appear that
soulless (although I've encountered many nasty characters in my years
as a clinical supervisor), and none of my students have ever fit that
bill. On balance, it seems far more likely that the wretched actions
that embarrass the profession result from a more complicated mix of
institutional forces, undeveloped character, and psychological frailty.
Lisa Lerman's elaborate investigation into the stories of lawyer
overbilling offers some helpful insights on this point.2 1 9 Lerman
researched a number of high profile, large-sum billing and accounting fraud cases emanating from prestigious law firms across the country. The lawyers whose misdeeds she reports stole, in some cases,
millions of dollars from clients and partners. 220 In addition to conveying the extent of this kind of behavior, Lerman asks "Why did they do
it?"221 Her hypotheses support the proposition described above. She
inquires into the possibility that these unscrupulous lawyers were "bad
apples," 222 which seems to equate with my "sociopath" thesis, 223 and

she finds no evidence to support that theory.2 24 She also rules out
2 25
mental illness as a likely culprit.

Lerman's most plausible explanations point to the culture of the
law firms, the culture of modern corporate America, and the absence
of the kind of stable bonds and supportive community that might offer strength and courage in the face of enormous pressures to succeed, and to make a lot of money. 226 Her ideas are consistent with
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking, supra note 56.
See id. at 233-45.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 255-57.
See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
See Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking, supra note 56, at 257-58. From her research about

the lawyers' reputation, background, and other activities, Lerman concludes that the lawyers were "the least likely suspects" to have demonstrated a lack of moral restraint. Most of
the lawyers rationalized their actions and, when caught, expressed seemingly sincere remorse. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (predicting that the felons, whores, and
jerks would offer some arguments defending their bad behavior).
225. Id. at 257. Some of the lawyers alleged forms of mental illness in their defense to
the charges, but Lerman concludes that serious mental illness was not sufficiently evident
to serve as a broad reason for the overbilling and cheating.
226. Lerman suspects a powerful "fear of falling" among the high-powered, very successful lawyers who fell victim to the urge to pad their accounts. See id. at 254. She also
notes the growing importance of money as the benchmark of success within the profession,
and the accompanying pressures on practicing lawyers to measure their worth by that standard. See id. at 219.
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those of many other thoughtful critics. 227 The felons, whores, and

jerks may be less "bad" as people and more stuck in a maelstrom from
which they have neither the wherewithal nor the courage to extract
themselves.
If that suggestion is correct, at least for some of the felons,
whores, and jerks, the implications for ethics instruction are significant. As Eleanor Myers argues:
While there is surely a role for education in influencing moral or
ethical behavior, that role should be properly understood. Even
the finest moral education-one that teaches the rules of the profession, attempts to cultivate the capacity for reflective moral judgment, and actively engages students in values clarification and
moral choice-is likely to be undermined if the workplaces in
of
which our students practice systematically undercut expressions
2 28
personal values or constrain the exercise of judgment.
It seems plain that the law schools will not effect significant
change within law firm culture in the short term. 229 In fact, some see
the prime purpose of law schools as to enculturate students to the law
firm world. 230 The prospects of altering and improving the ethos of
law firms by participation in "professionalism" and "civility" activities
of the Bar seem equally futile. 2 31 Perhaps the modeling of virtuous
behavior by law professors, especially in clinical programs where students can experience pressures and tensions in a direct way, will help
students begin to develop moral insights and character traits necessary
227. See, e.g.,
Myers, supra note 49, at 828-29; Tanina Rostain, The Company We Keep:
Kronman's The Lost Lawyer and the Development of Moral Imagination in the Practiceof Law, 21
LAw & Soc. INQuIRY 1017, 1035 (1996) ("The sociological findings suggest that current
trends toward increased practice specialization will severely hamper the development of
[the] affective qualities [necessary for moral practice]. A radical reorganization of the legal
profession may be required if deliberative ideals are to be realized on any meaningful
scale."); Jack L. Sammons, The ProfessionalismMovement: The Problems Defined, 7 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 269, 276-79 (1993); Patrick Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and
Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871,
912-15 (1999).
228. Myers, supra note 49, at 829. Myers's quote implies a conception of "personal"
values that I have sought to undermine earlier in this article. See supra notes 93-102 and
accompanying text. That possible disagreement with this thesis of this article does not undermine the importance of her point about the professional culture.
229. See Richard A. Matasar, The Two Professionalismsof Legal Education, 15 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 99, 100 (2001).
230. SeeJonathan R. Macy, Civic Education and Interest Group Formationin American Law
Schools, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1937, 1952 (1993).
231. For sustained criticism of the bar's professionalism "crusades," see Atkinson, Dissenter's Commentary, supra note 4, at 263; Pearce, ProfessionalismParadigmShift, supra note 3,
at 1230-33.
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to maintain integrity within the competitive world of high-priced
23 2
lawyering.
It is not easy to be sanguine, of course. The fundamental structural and institutional problems of law practice, as Deborah Rhode
reminds us, cannot be separated from the influence of money. 233 So
long as the pursuit of profit, perhaps not of the money itself but for
the value that annual income has come to represent in the competi23 4
tive differentiation of winners and losers within large firm culture,
remains the raison d'etre of law firms in the United States, the capacity
for law schools to overcome the institutional forces faced by vulnerable lawyers will probably be minimal. But others do offer some hope.
Prominent scholars argue that a richer conception of moral responsibility and accountability, 23 5 as well as greater efforts to foster the exercise of complex judgments about practice,2 36 might reduce the
alienation and dissatisfaction so prevalent among lawyers these days.
Less alienation, in turn, may lead to healthier approaches to moral
choices, and stronger character to resist the pressures to cheat in order to win. Less alienation might also imply a stronger and more
meaningful sense of community among practicing lawyers, and for
many scholars the potential for community and a sense of belonging
23 7
relates strongly to the development of moral character.
Conclusion
My puzzling about the challenges of talking about, and then
teaching about, values and ethics leads to some tentative conclusions.
First, it seems to matter a lot whether we intend to teach this subject
because we want to add to the students' repertoire as moral deliber232. Cf Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. Rv. 9, 32-33
(1995) (suggesting that "moral activist" lawyering must be modeled in clinics, even if poor
clients' interests are betrayed in the process).
233. D. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 31.
234. See id. at 33; Schiltz, supra note 227, at 904-06.
235. See D. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 17; Baron & Greenstein, supra note 104, at 97.
236. See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 47, 109-37.
237. See, e.g.,
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Honor as a Deficient Aspiration for "The Honorable
Profession:" The Lawyer as Nostromo, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 859, 893 (2000) ("it is within communities-within families, religious congregations, and friendships-that we can find
moral foundations"); Lerman, Blue Chip Bilking, supra note 56, at 254-55 (noting a lack of
"stable professional bonds" on the part of the lawyers who succumbed to the pressure to
cheat); Sammons, supra note 227, at 295-98 (lamenting the "increasing corruption of the
larger society as it becomes a community without the civic friendship upon which the liberal tradition depends and without the decency upon which the civic friendship
depends").
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ators, or because we want to persuade or encourage them not to act
badly in practice. It helps to see that the two goals are different, and
that one might be more attainable than the other. Second, it seems,
contrary to some thinking, that conceptions of value are neither
ephemeral, personal, idiosyncratic, nor non-negotiable. One can locate a rich overlapping consensus about what counts as good. The
differences among persons on moral questions that appear so entrenched and so irresolvable may be both of those things, but perhaps
not because of differences in values. Instead, those conflicts often will
represent differing perceptions about the world, and not about what
constitutes a good, or a virtue. Third, having recognized the possibility
of consensus, teachers may teach about values in precisely the same
way that teachers teach about law. Contrary to what we might suppose,
argument about moral positions is no less reasoned, analogical, and
structured than argument within legal analysis. Within bioethics, a
process of evaluating moral choice using the consensus represented
by paradigm cases has gained much credibility and acceptance. That
process, known as casuistry, offers opportunities for the same kind of
principled discussion about values-not "personal" values, or "idiosyncratic" values, but values as shared notions of the good-among law
students and lawyers.
Finally, for the "felons, whores, and jerks" among us, we have less
optimism about changing their behavior and fewer insights developed
from the puzzling process. A few important observations, though, do
seem warranted. If the sophisticated chroniclers of the deliberative
method are right, then it is more difficult to be certain that the seemingly nasty professionals are in fact acting nastily. If the critics are
right that the nasty professionals are indeed nasty, the question then
becomes why they act in this way. It seems unlikely that they are true
sociopaths, and unlikely that they intended to act correctly but just
missed the mark. The remaining possibility is that the nasty professionals are not nasty, as such, but are weak and overwhelmed, and
succumb to enormous institutional pressures to cheat and to win.
That likely possibility creates particular challenges to those educators
who hope to inspire, instill, or otherwise encourage an ethos of goodness in their students.

710

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

